PEARSON

v.

YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO.

Citator

Cited By (49 total)

• United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (U.S. 1975)
  …e identity of the person assaulted or imped[ed] or intimidated or that the person assaulted is a federal officer.” Id., at 525. The Second Circuit consistently has so held. See, e. g., United States v. Lombardozzi, 335 F. 2d 414, 416, cert. denied, 379 U. S. 914 (1964); United States v. Montanaro, 362 F. 2d 527, 528, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 920 (1966); United States v. Ulan, 421 F. 2d 787, 788 (1970). We are content to state the issue this way despite its potential to mislead. Labeling a requirement “juris…

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• United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983)
  …l officer .... ” United States v. Goodwin, 440 F. 2d 1152, 1155 (3d Cir. 1971). Had Congress intended otherwise, “it could easily have made knowledge an essential ingredient.” United States v. Lombardozzi, 335 F. 2d 414, 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914, 85 S.Ct. 261,13 L.Ed.2d 185 (1964). Id. at 654. Congress has made knowledge an element of the crime defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1084. We now turn to the question whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lauro knew that an inter…
• United States v. Piero Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967)
  …with his requests to charge and at that time he was assured by the court that he had an exception with regard to any of the requests refused. [*248] In the cases of United States v. Lombardozzi, 335 F. 2d 414, 10 A.L.R.3d 826 (2 Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 914, 85 S.Ct. 261, 13 L.Ed.2d 185 (1964), and United States v. Montanaro, 362 F. 2d 527 (2 Cir. 1966), this court held that knowledge that the one interfered with was a federal agent is not an essential element of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 111, which…