BRIAN BARKER MALE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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This case considers whether a defendant's confession, made after consulting with his attorney, violates his constitutional right to counsel. The court held that the confession was admissible because it was made voluntarily after the defendant had the opportunity to consult with his attorney.
No, the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to counsel. The confession was admissible because it was made voluntarily after the defendant had the opportunity to consult with his attorney.
“The only substantial question presented on this appeal is whether or not the defendant was denied his constitutional right to counsel under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977.”
This quote frames the central legal issue of the appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was arrested and transported to the police station. He was advised that any statement must be voluntary. The defendant requested and was…
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The only substantial question presented on this appeal is whether or not the defendant was denied his constitutional right to counsel under the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977.
y The pertinent sequence of events leading to the defendant’s confession is as follows: (1) Defendant was placed under arrest at his place of employment and transported to the homicide office of the Public Safety Department; (2) he was advised that if he talked about any aspect of the case he would have to do so freely and voluntarily; (3) the accused requested permission to contact his attorney and permission was granted; (4) after he had contacted his attorney, the defendant implicated himself by confessing that he was one of those who participated in the crime.
On this appeal, it is urged that, having been allowed to communicate with his attorney, the examination should have ceased until the attorney arrived. We are unable to subscribe to such a rule, and we do not find it implicit in the Escobedo decision.
From the record before us, it is apparent that the appellant made his statement freely and voluntarily after consultation with his attorney. The record does not reveal whether appellant’s attorney advised him to confess or to remain silent until a later time. The intention of the attorney to consult with the appellant again is not important in view of the fact that the appellant voluntarily confessed when he knew he had a right to await his attorney if he wished to do so. Cf. Montgomery v. State, Fla.1965, 176 So.2d 331.
Affirmed.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. It appears that the interrogation of the appellant continued while the counsel he had contacted was on the way to the police station. The alleged confession was obtained while the police officers and the appellant were awaiting the arrival of the attorney. I would hold that the cause is governed by Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and grant a new trial.
BARKDULL, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. It appears that the interrogation of the appellant continued while the counsel he had contacted was on the way to the police station. The alleged confession was obtained while the police officers and the appellant were awaiting the arrival of the attorney. I would hold that the cause is governed by Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and grant a new trial.
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Citator
Cited By
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Earnest Collins, Jr. v. State, 197 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…iate Judge (dissenting) . I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court on the authority of Montgomery v. State, Fla., 176 So. 2d 331; Calloway v. State, Fla., 189 So. 2d 617; Dampier v. State, Fla.App., 180 So. 2d 183; Male v. State, Fla.App., 189 So. 2d 521; Thomas v. State, Fla., 92 So. 2d 621; Epperly v. State, Fla.App., 189 So. 2d 531; and Miori v. State, Fla.App., 189 So. 2d 208. The confession which the majority opinion holds inadmissible was one given freely and voluntarily by the defendant and…
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Male v. State, 200 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1967)…Certiorari denied without opinion. 189 So. 2d 521.…
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Brown v. State, 192 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…o find error in the trial court’s holding that the admissions made by the appellant to the police officials were voluntary. See: Young v. State, Fla.1962, 140 So. 2d 97; [*796] Roberts v. State, Fla.1964, 164 So. 2d 817; Male v. State, Fla.App.1966, 189 So. 2d 521. As to the second point, it is apparent from a reading of the record that the notice of intention to rely on the defense of insanity was an attempt to amend the appellant’s plea and to raise this defense pursuant to the provisions of § 909.17, Fla.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (U.S. 1964)
- Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965)