JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION,
v.
ESTATE OF JOSE LOVERA, ET AL.
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The Florida Supreme Court held that an executor's payment of interest on a mortgage debt during the statutory claims period does not waive the creditor's obligation to file a formal proof of claim against the estate. The court affirmed that mortgage liens are enforceable without claims filing, but other debts remain barred under Florida's probate statute unless properly presented.
No. The payment of interest on a mortgage does not constitute a waiver of the statutory requirement to file proof of claim. Mortgage liens are enforceable without claims filing, but interest payments alone do not evidence an intent to treat the debt as an ordinary estate claim exempt from the filing requirement.
“With the exception of the mortgage lien and right to foreclose same the Legislature did not see fit to exempt other debts and demands from the operation of the statute, and this Court is powerless to create such an exception.”
Establishes that only mortgage liens are statutorily exempt from claims-filing requirements; no other debts can be exempted by judicial creation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJefferson Standard Life Insurance Company held a mortgage secured by duly recorded lien on property of a deceased debtor. During the statutory period …
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— The decisive question presented by this record has been agreed upon by the parties as follows: “Does the payment of interest on the principal indebtedness secured by a duly recorded mortgage, by the Executor of an estate, liable for the payment of the debt, during the statutory period for filing claims, waive the necessity of filing proof of claim as required by Chapter 11994, Acts 1927, General Laws of Florida, barring all debts and demands of whatsoever nature against an estate when not so presented?”
We think the question must be answered in the negative, and the decree appealed from affirmed, on the authority of our recent decision in the case of Smith, Liquidator, v. Fecheimer, 124 Fla. 757, 169 Sou. Rep. 395 (opinion filed June 30, 1936) wherein it was stated by Brown, J., speaking for this Court:
“With the exception of the mortgage lien and right to foreclose same the Legislature did not see fit to exempt other debts and demands from the operation of the statute, and this Court is powerless to create such an exception.”
The payment of interest to defer institution of foreclosure proceedings on a mortgage that might, under the statute, be enforced, absent any presentation as a claim against the estate of the deceased mortgagor, without more, is not sufficient to amount to a waiver of presentation as required by law such as would warrant a deficiency decree, as such payment is entirely consistent with the idea that the mortgage is to be recognized as an enforceable lien only, and no contrary intent should be inferred from the bare fact of interest payments made under circumstances per*684fectly consistent with the last mentioned hypothesis as to the motive thereof.
Decree affirmed.
Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis, Terrell, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
On Petition for Rehearing.
— The Court did not overlook its previous decisions to the effect that “the payment of interest upon a mortgage executed by a decedent may, in effect, dispense with or assume a presentation of the mortgage claim” to personal representatives within the statutory period. See Miller v. Crosby, 68 Fla. 365, 67 Sou. Rep. 76.
Where a waiver of the statute of non-claim is set up and relied on as basis for obtaining a deficiency decree upon a mortgage debt, the present status of the law is not such that, in every case, a waiver of the non-claim statute, must be implied from the bare fact of interest payments being made by the executor during the period fixed by Chapter 11994, Acts 1927, for filing claims, where the payment of the interest, and even an alleged request for an extension of time for other payments, have failed to impress the chancellor below as having been intended by the executor as a waiver of the statute of non-claim, by reason of which such chancellor has refused entry of a deficiency decree, the latter being in a measure discretionary with the chancellor, especially in cases of doubtful right to it under particular circumstances, such as are herein shown.
Rehearing denied.
Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis, Terrell, Brown, Buford and Davis, J. J., concur.
On Petition for Rehearing.
Per Curiam.
— The Court did not overlook its previous decisions to the effect that “the payment of interest upon a mortgage executed by a decedent may, in effect, dispense with or assume a presentation of the mortgage claim” to personal representatives within the statutory period. See Miller v. Crosby, 68 Fla. 365, 67 Sou. Rep. 76.
Where a waiver of the statute of non-claim is set up and relied on as basis for obtaining a deficiency decree upon a mortgage debt, the present status of the law is not such that, in every case, a waiver of the non-claim statute, must be implied from the bare fact of interest payments being made by the executor during the period fixed by Chapter 11994, Acts 1927, for filing claims, where the payment of the interest, and even an alleged request for an extension of time for other payments, have failed to impress the chancellor below as having been intended by the executor as a waiver of the statute of non-claim, by reason of which such chancellor has refused entry of a deficiency decree, the latter being in a measure discretionary with the chancellor, especially in cases of doubtful right to it under particular circumstances, such as are herein shown.
Rehearing denied.
Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis, Terrell, Brown, Buford and Davis, J. J., concur.
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In re the Est. of Ollie M. Woods, 133 Fla. 730 (Fla. 1938)…fits secured to them by the laws of the State for such unreasonable time as to practically deprive them of their property.” See also Smith v. Fechheimer, 124 Fla. 727, 169 So. 395; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Lovera, 125 Fla. 628, 171 So. 512. We are of the opinion that a reasonable construction of Section 33 of Article III makes it applicable primarily to general statutes of limitations, and that it cannot be said with logic or reason that this section was violated in the present case.…
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Marshall Lodge No. 39 v. Woodson, 139 Fla. 579 (Fla. 1939)…s 1927, Sec. 2.) The plaintiff in error in oral argument and brief has cited a number of cases but relies upon the case of Ramseyer v. Datson, 120 Fla. 414, 162 So. 904, and the cases therein cited; also upon Jefferson Standard L. I. Co. v. Lovera, 125 Fla. 682, 171 So. 512, and Clark v. Fullerton, 130 Fla. 150, 177 So. 851. Defendant in error contends that several statements in the opinion in the Datson case were obiter dictum, and furthermore that the facts in that case were different in some essential r…1 / 2
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Clark v. Fullerton, 130 Fla. 150 (Fla. 1937)…acate same should be reversed and the cause remanded for reconsideration and readjudication by the Chancellor, in the light of two recent decisions by1 the court therein referred to, the ‘latest being Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Lovera, 125 Fla. 682, 171 So. 512. In that case it was said: “The court did not overlook its previous decisions to the effect that ‘the payment of interest upon a mortgage executed by a decedent may, in effect, dispense with or assume a presentation of the mortgage cla…
Authorities Cited
- Smith v. Feschheimer, 124 Fla. 757 (Fla. 1936)
- Miller v. Crosby, 68 Fla. 365 (Fla. 1914)