FAIRFAX FAMILY FUND, INC.
v.
CALIFORNIA

U.S. | 1965-10-11
No. 124
382 U.S. 1 Supreme Court of the United States (1965) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 86 S. Ct. 34 · 15 L. Ed. 2d 6 · 1965 U.S. LEXIS 515 · SCDB 1965-002
Cited by 12 cases
Topics
Dormant Commerce Clause Commerce Clause

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Per_curiam
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

Dissent
Mr. Justice Douglas,

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

Appellant is a Kentucky corporation engaged in a mail-order loan business in thirty-two' States. It has no offices, no agents, no employees, and no property in California. It solicits loans from California residents by mail; after a credit report is prepared by a local independent contractor, the loan application is passed on by appellant’s officers in Kentucky. If the loan is approved, the check is mailed to the borrower from Kentucky. Because appellant failed to obtain a license from the State of California and pay the annual $200 fee, appellee sought and obtained an injunction barring appellant from conducting its out-of-state small-loan business until the requisite California license was obtained. In order to obtain a license, the lender must display “the financial responsibility, experience, character, and general fitness . . . such as to command the confidence of the community and to warrant belief that the business will be operated honestly, fairly, and efficiently . . . Cal. Fin. Code § 24206.

Our decisions have heretofore precluded a State from exacting a license of a firm doing an exclusively interstate business as a condition of entry into the State. See, e. g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, 366 U. S. 276, 278-289; see also id., at 288, 289-292 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Appellee would characterize these California statutes as primarily of a regulatory nature, invoking Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, in which the majority of the Court held that a State might exclude an interstate insurance company which failed to meet certain minimum reserve requirements designed to assure that the insurer is financially solvent.

But here California exacts a $200 annual fee as a condition of obtaining and maintaining a license. As we recognized in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 112: “The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” The California District Court of Appeal viewed the fee as one designed to offset the expenses of administering the licensing system itself. From California’s characterization of the fee* it is not one to “defray the cost of purely local regulations” which we indicated was permissible in Murdock, 319 U. S., at 114, n. 8. (Emphasis added.)

Because I believe that this case presents substantial and important constitutional questions, I would note probable jurisdiction and set this case down for argument.

*

“The charges or expenses imposed by the licensing procedure are no larger in amount than is reasonably necessary to defray the administrative expenses involved California v. Fairfax Family Fund, 235 Cal. App. 2d 881, 884, 47 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Credicorp v. State, 659 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …not merely a tax. It is first and foremost state regulation of a matter of local concern through the police power. The instant case is similar to California v. Fairfax Family Fund, Inc., 235 Cal.App.2d 881, 47 Cal.Rptr. 812 (1964), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 34, 15 L.Ed.2d 6 (1965). In that case the court held that a Kentucky corporation engaged in the business of making small loans by mail to residents of California and 31 other states, which had loans of $3,500,000 outstanding to Californi…
  • United States v. Agostino, 608 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1979)
    …21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S. C.A. § 2. . Since we find sufficient probable cause for the arrest, we need not reach Agostino’s further argument that the search exceeded the reasonable scope of a stop within the meaning of Terry v. Ohio, 1968, 382 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 or Canal Zone v. Bender, 5 Cir., 1978, 573 F. 2d 1329.…
  • Brotherhood OF Locomotive Firemen AND Enginemen v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 413 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1969)
    …s-Seaboard agreement. The principles of res judicata are applicable to fully litigated issues raised by a motion to intervene. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 8 Cir. 1964, 338 F. 2d 906, 911, cert. denied, 1965, 382 U.S. 815, 86 S.Ct. 34, 15 L.Ed.2d 62, and res judicata applies to the issue of jurisdiction, Hicks v. Holland, 6 Cir. 1956, 235 F. 2d 183, cert. denied, 1956, 352 U.S. 855, 77 S.Ct. 83, 1 L.Ed.2d 66; cf. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Louisville & Nashv…

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