PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
v.
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.
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The Supreme Court held that a three-judge district court was not required when the sole ground for enjoining a state order was its conflict with a federal statute, not its unconstitutionality. Therefore, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction for a direct appeal.
A railroad sued to enjoin a state commission's order, arguing it conflicted with a federal statute. The three-judge District Court agreed and issued a…
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Per Curiam.
In the three-judge District Court from which this appeal comes to us, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company sued to enjoin the enforcement of a duly promulgated order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission on the sole ground that the order conflicted with a federal statute. The Commission, among other defenses, con tended that the federal statute was unconstitutional, but the District Court decided the case in favor of the railroad and issued an appropriate injunction. 240 F. Supp. 233.
It follows from our recent decision in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, ante, p. 111, that the injunction sought by the railroad, being based on incompatibility between the state order and the federal statute, was not grounded in the “unconstitutionality” of a state measure so as to require a three-judge tribunal under 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1964 ed.). Nor is § 2282, requiring such a tribunal in order to enjoin “any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution,” invoked by the Commission’s defense that the federal statute is unconstitutional; it is settled that this provision “does not provide for a case where the validity of an Act of Congress is merely drawn in question, albeit that question be decided, but only for a case where there is an application for an interlocutory or permanent injunction to restrain the enforcement of an Act of Congress.” Garment Workers v. Donnelly Co., 304 U. S. 243, 250.
Because a three-judge court was not required to adjudicate this suit, this Court has no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 (1964 ed.) to entertain a direct appeal. It does not appear from the record that the Commission lodged a protective appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the time to do so has almost certainly expired. The appeal to this Court occurred before Swift & Co. v. Wick-ham, supra, was decided, and there is no reason why the Commission should be deprived of appellate review. In accordance with precedent, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the District Court so that it may enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 254.
It is so ordered.
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Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1969)…ctions were all heard before three-judge district courts. We have jurisdiction over an appeal brought directly from the three-judge court only if the three-judge court was properly convened. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 382 U. S. 281 (1965); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 5 (1965); see 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Appellants initially claimed that the statutes and regulations in question violated the Fifteenth Amendment. However, by stipulation these claims were removed from the cases prior…
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Wilson v. City OF Port Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1968)…to do so may have expired. Therefore, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the District Court so that it may enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals. Utility Comm’n v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 382 U. S. 281, 282. It is so ordered.…
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Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welf. Comm'n, 393 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1968)…ree-judge order. Therefore, we vacate the order of the three-judge court and remand the case to the District Court so that a timely appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals. See Wilson v. Port Lavaca, supra; Utility Comm’n v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 382 U. S. 281, 282. The appeal from the decision of the single judge is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It is so ordered. * We think it makes no difference in principle that in Wilson v. Port Lavaca the single judge actually adopted the opinion of the t…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1941)
- Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304 U.S. 243 (U.S. 1938)