STATE, EX REL. KELLY GREESON
v.
ABEL J. ROBERTS, AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE

Fla. | 1936-11-02
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
126 Fla. 114 Florida Supreme Court (1936) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 170 So. 457
Cited by 11 cases

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Synopsis

Florida Supreme Court held that state Chapter 17257, Acts of 1935 is the exclusive law governing licensing of slot machines and coin-operated devices, preempting Jacksonville's attempt to impose an independent municipal license tax. The petitioner was unlawfully detained for refusing to pay the city's $100 license tax.


Holding

Chapter 17257, Acts of 1935 is the sole and exclusive law on the subject of licensing slot machines and coin-operated devices. Municipalities lack independent authority to impose license taxes on such devices outside the framework established by state law. The petitioner must be discharged from custody.


Key Quotes

“Chapter 17257, Acts of 1935, is now the sole and exclusive law on the subject.”

Establishes the court's holding that state law preempts municipal regulation of slot machines and coin-operated devices.

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Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner was taken into custody by Jacksonville for refusing to pay a $100 license tax for operating a coin-operated device under City Ordinance X-9…

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Opinion of the Court
Terrell, J.

Terrell, J.

Petitioner was taken in custody by the City of Jacksonville for refusing to pay a license tax of $100.00 for operating a coin operated device as prescribed by Section Two of Ordinance Number X-90, effective October 14,, 1936. He seeks relief by habeas corpus.

The question we are called on to resolve is whether Chapter 17257, Acts of 1935, is the exclusive law of this state on the subject of licensing slot machines and coin operated devicés, or may the City of Jacksonville impose a license tax on them independent of the state law on the subject.

The respondent contends that under the provisions of Section 1, Chapter 5065, Special Acts of 1901, it has the power to tax slot machines independent of Chapter 17257, Acts of 1935, and relies on Canova v. Williams, 41 Fla. 509, 27 So. 30, and like decisions, to support this contention.

We have read Canova v. Williams and other decisions relied on. We have also read Section Two of Ordinance Number X-90 of the City of Jacksonville imposing a license tax on slot machines and we have read with interest the review of the general revenue laws and the decisions of this Court cqnstruing them, submitted in support of respondent’s contention, but in our view Chapter 17257, Acts of 1935, is now the sole and exclusive law on the subject.

Chapter 17257, Acts of 1935, is the latest expression of the Legislature on the subject of licensing slot machines and coin, operated devices, it covers the whole subject matter fully, it defines a different policy from that heretofore in force, it-sets out in terms the amounts that may be *116imposed as'license taxes by the state, county, and municipality, and its provisions are such as to expressly repeal every other law on the subject. State, ex rel. Bradford, v Stoutamire, 98 Fla. 486, 123 So. 834, and cases therein cited; State, ex rel. Baker, v. McCarthy, 122 Fla. 749, 166 So. 280.

The administration of the Act is placed in the hands of the Comptroller and wé find nothing in its provisions that expressly or impliedly authorizes municipalities to impose a tax independently of that imposed by the state. It is well settled that implied powers in conflict with express ones will not be granted. Reasonable" doubt as to municipal power must be resolved against the city. Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 62 So. 922.

It follows that the power contended for by the respondent is without support so the petitioner should be discharged.

It is so ordered.

Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Am. Bakeries Co. v. City of Haines City, 131 Fla. 790 (Fla. 1938)
    …t vehicles used for hire. True, the general Act contained a general repealing clause, but it is doubtful that this Court would have reached a different conclusion if that clause had been omitted. • _ Likewise in State, ex rel. Greeson, v. Roberts, .126 Fla. 114, 170 So. 457, the state statute relating to slot machines was held to deprive the City of Jacksonville of the power to impose a license on coin-operated devices. In that case the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Terrell, said: “Chapter 17257, Act…
    1 / 2
  • City of St. Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1950)
    …Acts of 1931, in its application to the plaintiffs-appellees? It is contended that the ruling of the lower Court is sustained by our rulings in the following cases: Langston v. Lundsford, 122 Fla. 813, 165 So. 898; State ex rel. Greeson v. Roberts, 126 Fla. 114, 170 So. 457; City of Orlando v. Gill, 128 Fla. 139, 174 So. 224; American Bakeries Co. v. City of Haines City, 131 Fla. 790, 180 So. 524; Town of Hallandale v. Broward-County Kennel Club, 152 Fla. 266, 10 So. 2d 810. The rule of construction is viz…
  • City of Orlando v. Gill, 128 Fla. 139 (Fla. 1937)
    …pool or billiard halls it supersedes all special legislative Acts theretofore passed inconsistent with its provisions. It is not necessary for us to go beyond this jurisdiction for authority for this holding. See State, ex rel. Greeson, v. Roberts, 126 Fla. 114, 170 Sou. 457. Demurrer to the declaration suggested that the declaration showed upon its face that the payment of the tax was a voluntary payment and, therefore, the plaintiff had no cause of action. It is a general rule, and one that is well reco…

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