FRANCES KROLL, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF I. JACK KROLL, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
STEINFELDT-THOMPSON CO., INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, W. GORDON SCHMITT AND HAROLD MELSEL, APPELLEES

Fla. | 1966-09-28
No. 34501
THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS, DREW and CALDWELL, JJ., concur., ERVIN, J., dissents.
190 So. 2d 760 Florida Supreme Court (1966) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The decision of the District Court of Appeal, 176 So.2d 520, is affirmed on authority of our opinion in Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, 190 So.2d 777.

The writ of certiorari is discharged.

THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS, DREW and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, J., dissents.


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  • Brown v. Giffen Indus., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973)
    …with a request for additional medical care. The Court held that voluntarily furnishing medical care in 1957 after the Statute of Limitations had run did not revive the claimant’s right to further medical care and treatment. In Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So. 2d 760 (Fla.1966), a claim for compensation was made more than two years following the last payment of compensation pursuant to an award, the Court held the claim barred by the limitations period specified in Section 440.28, Florida Statutes. In Hodges v.…
  • Univ. OF Fla. & Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. McLARTHY, 483 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    …ation benefits, regardless of their classification as either temporary or permanent, the rule is that a carrier’s voluntary payment or reinstatement of benefits does not trigger the time provisions of section 440.19(l)(a). See Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla.1966) (section 440.19(l)(a) “is limited ... to the situation where payments are made without an award, in which case further payments may be made within two years after payment of compensation or remedial treatment”). Accord Bassett’s Dair…
  • Watson v. DELTA Airlines, Inc., 288 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1973)
    …award,” in which case the two-year statute of limitations runs from the last voluntary compensation payment or last remedial treatment so furnished by the employer without an award. Justice Drew with characteristic clarity in Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla.1966), points up “the clear distinction made in this instance [§ 440.19(1)(a)] and throughout the act between medical benefits and disability compensation” and then highlights the exception in explicating that § 440.19(1) (a) “is limited,…

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