LEONARD E. JONES, PETITIONER,
v.
LUDMAN CORPORATION, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND THE FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1966-10-12
No. 35396
THORNAL, C. J., and O’CONNELL, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
190 So. 2d 760 Florida Supreme Court (1966) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for certiorari review of a commission order reversing his award of temporary total disability compensation. The court held that a claim for additional disability compensation filed more than two years after the last payment of compensation is precluded by statute, regardless of whether the claim is characterized as modification or additional benefits.


Holding

The court held that the claim is barred by Section 440.28. A determination of disability compensation becomes final and unalterable unless modified by petition filed within two years after the last payment of compensation. The distinction between claims for medical benefits (governed by Section 440.19(1)(a)) and disability compensation is explicit throughout the act, and the claim cannot be recharacterized as merely seeking additional benefits to circumvent the statutory deadline.


Key Quotes

“a determination of disability compensation becomes final and unalterable unless modified upon petition filed within the specified time after the last payment of compensation”

Establishes the core holding that disability compensation awards are final unless modification is timely sought

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Facts & Procedural History

Jones received permanent partial compensation in 1960 under an initial workers' compensation order. Remedial care was subsequently furnished under tha…

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Opinion of the Court
DREW, Justice.

DREW, Justice.

The petitioner seeks review of an order of the commission reversing an award of temporary total disability compensation for the months of February and March 1963. The commission found that this claim for additional compensation, filed in October 1964, was precluded by the terms of F.S. Section 440.28, F.S.A., providing a compensation award may be modified only upon application “prior to two years after the date of the last payment of compensation’’ pursuant thereto.1

Petitioner’s initial claim was determined by an order under which the last payment of permanent partial compensation was made in 1960. Remedial care has since been furnished under that and subsequent orders and is not here in dispute. An intervening award of further temporary total compensation was in 1963 reversed, and certiorari was denied in this Court on June 24, 1964. Jones v. Ludman Corp., 165 So.2d 767.

Petitioner contends that his current claim is not one for modification but simply for additional benefits and should be governed by Sec. 440.19(1) (a).2 The language of that section is limited, however, as already noted in the earlier decision relied on by the commission,3 to the situation where payments are made without an award, in which case further claims may be made within two years after payment of compensation or remedial treatment. In view of the clear distinction made in this instance and throughout the act between medical benefits and disability compensation, we do not find error in the cited decision nor can we ignore the explicit provision of Sec. 440.28 by which a determination of disability compensation becomes final and unalterable unless modified upon *762petition filed within the specified time after the last payment of compensation.

Other contentions by petitioner in contest of the orders of the commission and deputy in this cause have been considered and found to be without merit.

Certiorari denied.

THORNAL, C. J., and O’CONNELL, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Brown v. Giffen Indus., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973)
    …with a request for additional medical care. The Court held that voluntarily furnishing medical care in 1957 after the Statute of Limitations had run did not revive the claimant’s right to further medical care and treatment. In Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So. 2d 760 (Fla.1966), a claim for compensation was made more than two years following the last payment of compensation pursuant to an award, the Court held the claim barred by the limitations period specified in Section 440.28, Florida Statutes. In Hodges v.…
  • Univ. OF Fla. & Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. McLARTHY, 483 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    …ation benefits, regardless of their classification as either temporary or permanent, the rule is that a carrier’s voluntary payment or reinstatement of benefits does not trigger the time provisions of section 440.19(l)(a). See Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla.1966) (section 440.19(l)(a) “is limited ... to the situation where payments are made without an award, in which case further payments may be made within two years after payment of compensation or remedial treatment”). Accord Bassett’s Dair…
  • Watson v. DELTA Airlines, Inc., 288 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1973)
    …award,” in which case the two-year statute of limitations runs from the last voluntary compensation payment or last remedial treatment so furnished by the employer without an award. Justice Drew with characteristic clarity in Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla.1966), points up “the clear distinction made in this instance [§ 440.19(1)(a)] and throughout the act between medical benefits and disability compensation” and then highlights the exception in explicating that § 440.19(1) (a) “is limited,…

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