BERNARD RAKOFF, DULY APPOINTED GUARDIAN OF DORIS RAKOFF, APPELLANT,
v.
WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, A NEBRASKA CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A guardian appeals a summary judgment denying disability and hospitalization insurance benefits for an incompetent ward suffering from schizophrenia. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the policy's exclusion for claims arising from insanity or mental disorders clearly applied to the ward's condition.
The court held that the exclusionary provisions in the policies were plain and unambiguous, and that all evidence established the ward was suffering from a mental disorder to which the exclusions applied. The court noted that insanity is a legal, not medical, term and must be interpreted according to contract construction rules.
“The word "insanity" is well known to be a legal and not a medical term.”
Establishes the interpretive framework: insanity is defined legally in the context of insurance contracts, not medically.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoris Rakoff was issued disability benefit and hospitalization policies by World Insurance Company. She was subsequently declared incompetent due to s…
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Appeal by Bernard Rakoff, guardian of Doris Rakoff, from a summary final judgment for defendant, World Insurance Company.
From the admitted facts, it appears that the defendant issued both a disability benefit policy and a hospitalization policy to Doris Rakoff. She was subsequently declared incompetent because of schizophrenic reaction and committed to the South Florida Hospital, where she is still confined. She is disoriented, incoherent, and a “complete, vegetating human being.”
Her guardian’s claims for benefits under the policies were denied on the grounds that the policies provided no coverage for sickness or disability resulting from or contributed to by insanity or mental disorders.
The guardian brought suit against the insurer for damages and suffered an adverse summary final judgment from which he now appeals. He contends that the incompetent, Doris Rakoff, was suffering from a condition which was physical, or organic in nature, as opposed to a mental disorder or insanity; and that this condition therefore was not excluded under the terms of the policy.
The word “insanity” is well known to be a legal and not a medical term. In re Pickles’ Petition, Fla.App.1965, 170 So. 2d 603. Though the word may have several different connotations in various applications, we are dealing here with the construction of terms of an insurance contract and are governed, therefore, by the rules set forth in Rigel v. National Casualty Company, Fla.1954, 76 So.2d 285:
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“We acknowledge the rules that if the language is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the Court to construe it, Goldsby v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 117 Fla. 889, 158 So. 502; that if uncertainty is present, the instrument should be construed against the insurer, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Cartmel, 87 Fla. 495, 100 So. 802, 35 A.L.R. 1013; that the Court should not extend strictness in construction to the point of adding a meaning to language that is clear, Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., Fla., 58 So.2d 857; and that the Court should construe the contract of insurance to give effect to the intent of the parties, New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Huckins, 127 Fla. 540, 173 So. 696.”
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Applying these rules and having reviewed the evidence before the trial judge, we find that the exclusions in these policies are plain and unambiguous, and that there is no issue of genuine material fact to disprove that Doris Rakoff was suffering from ‘insanity” or a “mental disorder.” All the evidence submitted shows some type of “mental disorder” which affected her brain, and the exclusionary provisions of the policy apply.
This opinion and decision is not to be construed to stand for the proposition that insanity or mental disorders resulting in-cidently or inevitably from a prior physical *478Infirmity, or disease, might not he covered under this type of insurance.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is hereby
Affirmed.
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Citator
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Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Alphonso Butler, 314 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1975)…or Stores #1 v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 243 So. 2d 228 (Fla.App.1, 1971); Home Indemnity Co. v. Alday, 213 So. 2d 13 (Fla.App.1, 1968); Continental Casualty Co. v. Borthwick, 177 So. 2d 687 (Fla.App.1, 1965); Rakoff v. World Insurance Co., 191 So. 2d 476 (Fla.App.3, 1966); Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 175 So. 2d 581 (Fla.App.3, 1965); Winter Garden Ornamental Nursery, Inc. v. Cappleman, 201 So. 2d 479 (Fla.App.4, 1967); and Graves v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co., 132 So. 2d 3…
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United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Morejon, 338 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…uld construe the contract of insurance to give effect to the intent of the parties . . . (citations omitted) Accord: Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, 175 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Rakoff v. World Insurance Company, 191 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Winter Garden Ornamental Nursery, Inc. v. Cappleman, 201 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). Florida courts adhere to the principle that a court should not rewrite a contract of insurance extending the coverage afforded beyond that…
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Jullan Valdes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 207 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…mbiguous language requires no special construction or interpretation. Such language will be given that meaning which it clearly expresses. Goldsby v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 117 Fla. 889, 158 So. 502 (1935); Rakoff v. World Insurance Co., Fla.App. 1966, 191 So. 2d 476; Oren v. General Accident Fire and Life Assur. Corp., Fla.App. 1965, 175 So. 2d 581. The issue here before us was decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Westerhausen v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 258 Iowa 969, 140 N.W. 2d 719 (19…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rigel v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 76 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954)
- The Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Prank Cartmel, 87 Fla. 495 (Fla. 1924)
- New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Alden Huckins, 127 Fla. 540 (Fla. 1937)
- Goldsby v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 117 Fla. 889 (Fla. 1935)
- Bradley v. Assocs. Disc. Corp., 58 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1952)
- Thomas v. State, 118 Fla. 1 (Fla. 1935)
- Petition of Jeanette Pickles to declare her daughter, 170 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Charles E. Booth under the last Will & Testament of Florence I. Herland v. Honorable John S. Byington, 170 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)