E. H. ARMSTRONG
v.
DURON W. BROWNING AND RELIANCE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decree that an absolute assignment of a life insurance policy was actually a lien to secure repayment of advanced premiums. The court found the allegations sufficient and the evidence ample to support the decree.
Yes, the court held that the decree was correct. The allegations in the bill of complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action, and there was ample legal evidence to support these allegations and the resulting decree.
“In this case the appeal is from final decree adjudicating in effect that án assignment Of a life- insurance policy absolute on its face was in fact an assignment to secure repayment of money advanced by the assignee to pay premiums on the policy, and therefore, constituted a lien-on the proceeds of the policy payable at the death of 'the insured.”
This quote summarizes the core issue and the lower court's finding that is being reviewed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involved an appeal from a final decree concerning a life insurance policy. The decree determined that an assignment, which appeared absolute …
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In this case the appeal is from final decree adjudicating in effect that án assignment Of a life- insurance policy absolute on its face was in fact an assignment to secure repayment of money advanced by the assignee to pay premiums on the policy, and therefore, constituted a lien-on the proceeds of the policy payable at the death of 'the insured.
, The allegations of the Bill of Complaint were sufficient to.state the cause of action and, if proved, to' warrant the relief sought. .
Thre was ample legal evidence to support the .allegations of the Bill of Complaint and to constitute sound basis for the decree.
We find no reversible error and the decree appealed from is therefore affirmed.
So ordered.
Affirmed.
Ellis, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur.
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Davis, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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