DANIEL J. NOLAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniel Nolan appealed the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, alleging his guilty plea was coerced through police threats and promises. The court reversed, holding that Nolan's allegations of coercion raised a factual issue requiring a hearing, despite the trial court's reliance on minute book entries showing counsel's presence.
The court reversed the denial of post-conviction relief, holding that Nolan's allegations of coercion raised a factual issue that could be resolved only by a hearing, and that the trial court erred in denying relief without a hearing based solely on minute book entries showing counsel's presence.
“The defendant's allegations may tax credulity; nevertheless, they do raise a factual issue of coercion which can be resolved only by a hearing.”
Establishes that the trial court erred in denying relief without a hearing, even though the allegations seemed incredible, because they raised a genuine factual dispute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNolan was charged with three counts of robbery in April 1961. On April 6, 1961, he appeared in court with a public defender, entered a guilty plea to …
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Daniel Joseph Nolan appeals an order .denying his petition for post-conviction relief under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, ch. 924 F.S.A. Appendix.
On April 3, 1961, an information was filed against petitioner charging him with •three counts of robbery. According to the .court minutes, on April 6, 1961, the petitioner appeared in open court with his court-appointed attorney, a representative from the office of the Public Defender. The state moved for an order of nolle prosequi as to Counts II and III, and the petitioner was arraigned as to Count I. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty, and the court deferred sentencing until April 20, 1961.
On April 20, 1961, petitioner appeared in open court for sentencing with his court-appointed attorney, a different representative from the office of the Public Defender for Broward County, at which time he was sentenced to ten years in prison.
Approximately five years later petitioner filed his Rule One motion alleging that after his arrest he was held incommunicado, questioned and beaten. Petitioner further alleges that, following his transfer to the Broward County Jail on April 2, 1961, two Hallandale robbery detectives came to his cell, promised him they would see that he received a sentence of not more than five years if he pleaded guilty, and threatened him with three life sentences if he refused.
Petitioner alleges that on April 6, 1961, he entered a plea of guilty to Count I without the assistance of counsel expecting to receive a five-year sentence. Petitioner asserts that it was after he had entered his plea that an attorney from the office of the Public Defender introduced himself as his attorney. Petitioner further alleges that he told said attorney of the representations of the detectives and asked him to withdraw his plea of guilty, but was informed that this could not be done. Petitioner also alleges that he was unable to find out who was his actual attorney and that the representative who appeared at sentencing refused to help him when acquainted with the foregoing facts.
The trial court denied relief without a hearing on the ground that defendant’s foregoing allegations of a coerced guilty plea were conclusively refuted by the court’s minute book entries disclosing the presence of a public defender at arraign*501ment and sentencing. This was error under the following decisions of three other district courts of appeal: Williams v. State, Fla.App.1966, 186 So.2d 279; Lee v. State, Fla.App.1965, 175 So.2d 95; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 191.1
The defendant’s allegations may tax credulity; nevertheless, they do raise a factual issue of coercion which can be resolved only by a hearing.
Reversed.
SMITH, C. J., and ANDREWS and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Tolar v. State, 196 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)…CROSS, Judge (concurring specially). I concur specially in the opinion of Justice Barns on the authority of Nolan v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 500. This is a case from this district and clearly sets forth the position of this court in matters under similar circumstances. ANDREWS, J., concurs specially in the opinion of CROSS, J. BARNS, PAUL D., Associate Judge, concurs.…
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Maxwood Clarence Brumley v. State, 224 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)…llant had a lawyer present and representing him at the time of arraignment does not refute the allegations in the motion with respect to coercion. Waley v. Johnston, supra; Lee v. State, Fla.App.1965, 175 So. 2d 95; and Nolan v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 500. Such fact, however, may be considered by the trial court at the time of the evidentiary hearing as relating to the ultimate issue to be decided. The record also indicates a long delay between the time of the guilty pleas and the time of the filing…
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. State, 165 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- LEE v. State, 175 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Williams v. State, 174 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Hamilton v. State, 186 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Farrington v. State, 183 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1966)
- Williams v. State, 186 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)