HOUGHTON
v.
SHAFER, GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.
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The Court held that a state prisoner suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of legal materials need not exhaust state administrative remedies if such remedies would be futile.
A state prisoner's legal materials, acquired for his pro se appeal, were confiscated by prison authorities. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but his co…
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Per Curiam.
Petitioner was convicted of burglary and is serving a sentence of four to 10 years in a Pennsylvania state prison. In pursuing his appeal pro se petitioner acquired law books, trial records, and other materials with the consent of prison authorities. Before petitioner had filed his appeal brief, prison authorities confiscated these materials because they were found in the possession of another inmate. Petitioner’s efforts to obtain the return of the materials were not successful, and he commenced this action in the United States District Court, claiming that the prison authorities had violated § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat. 13, now 42 U. S. C. § 1983, by depriving him of his legal materials. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that petitioner had not alleged exhaustion of state administrative remedies, citing Gaito v. Prasse, 312 F. 2d 169 (C. A. 3d Cir.). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed without opinion. We grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner’s legal materials were confiscated pursuant to prison rules forbidding the possession of articles not sold through the canteen or approved by the authorities and forbidding the unauthorized loaning of books to another inmate. According to the inmates’ handbook, petitioner could have taken his problem to the “Classification and Treatment Clinic”; it was also his privilege “to address a communication at any time to the Superintendent, the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, or the Commissioner of Correction, and as a final appeal, to the Attorney General.” Petitioner did seek relief from the Deputy Superintendent of his prison, but without result. He was told, he says, to “leave well enough alone.” His mother’s telephone calls and correspondence with prison authorities were likewise unavailing. He has not, however, taken an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, the Commissioner, or to the Attorney General.
As we understand the submission of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania in this Court, the rules of the prison were validly and correctly applied to petitioner; these rules are further said to be strictly enforced throughout the entire correctional system in Pennsylvania. In light of this it seems likely that to require petitioner to appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Correction, the Commissioner, or to the Attorney General would be to demand a futile act. In any event, resort to these remedies is unnecessary in light of our decisions in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 180-183; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671; and Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416. On the basis of these decisions, but without intimating any opinion on the merits of the underlying controversy concerning the prison rules, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (61 total)
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Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1973)…on the United States District Courts to entertain a state prisoner’s application for injunctive relief against allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 516-517, n. 18 (1972); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968). At the same time, we held that “[t]he remedy provided by these Acts is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.’ Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961); McNe…1 / 5
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Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (U.S. 1982)…d state administrative remedies. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63, n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312, n. 4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 472-473 (1974) (“When federal claims are premised on [§1983] — as they are here — we have not required e…
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Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1972)…entitled, inasmuch as this Court has never dealt with the special procedural problems presented by prisoners’ civil suits. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U. S. 15 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968); Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964). Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F. 2d 684, 688 (CA8 1967); Carey v. Settle, 351 F. 2d 483 (CA8 1965); Carswell v. Wainwright, 413 F. 2d 1044 (CA5 1969); Walker v. Pate, 3…
Previewing 3 of 61 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (U.S. 1961)
- McNEESE v. Bd. OF Educ. FOR Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187 Cahokia, 373 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1963)
- Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (U.S. 1967)
- Gaito v. Prasse, 312 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1963)