ANNE TURNER, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL TURNER, APPELLEE
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Anne Turner appealed a final divorce decree challenging its financial provisions. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the decree's allocation of marital assets but struck a provision requiring the husband to participate in a religious divorce ceremony, holding that courts lack authority to compel religious observances.
The court affirmed the financial provisions of the decree as supported by the trial court's finding that it could not trace equitable interests due to the parties' deceptive dealings. However, the court held that the trial court lacked statutory authority to order participation in a religious divorce ceremony and struck that provision.
“An examination of the statute reveals that there is no authorization for a chancellor to require the parties to secure a religious divorce.”
Establishes that Florida law does not permit courts to order participation in religious ceremonies as part of divorce proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnne Turner brought property worth approximately $70,000 and other assets of $30,000 into the marriage. During the marriage, the parties engaged in de…
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The appellant has appealed a final decree of divorce. She has assigned and argued error on each of the financial provisions of the decree. The appellee has cross assigned each provision which he deems adverse to him. The question presented in each instance is whether the record supports the finding of the chancellor.
While we cannot say that the record is without error, we hold that, with the exception of one particular hereafter discussed, it does not present reversible error. The essential holding of the chancellor is that because of devious and deceptive dealings of the parties he was unable, upon the evidence before him, to trace the equitable interest of the parties in the various assets acquired by the parties during their marriage.1 This holding is fully substantiated by the record. We therefore affirm the decree as to the attacks upon its financial provisions upon authority of Picchi v. Picchi, Fla.1958, 100 So.2d 627.
One of the cross assignments of error argued by the appellee urges that the following portion of the decree is unenforceable:
“(j) The defendant is ordered to cooperate with plaintiff in obtaining a Jewish divorce, any expense therefor shall be paid by the plaintiff.”
It is apparent that the thrust of the order by the chancellor to the appellee is that the appellee must submit to a religious ceremony 'in which he will be required to take an active part. If allowed to stand, this order would be enforceable by contempt proceedings and possibly by confinement of the appellee in jail.
The statutes of the State of Florida (see Ch. 65) provide for only one kind of divorce; that is, a civil divorce “from the bonds of matrimony”. An examination of the statute reveals that there is no authorization for a chancellor to require the parties to secure a religious divorce.
We have not considered the appellee’s contentions that requiring him to participate in a religious ceremony is a violation of his civil rights and the principle of the separation of church and state.
We hold that the circuit judge had no authority to order the appellee to partici*789pate in a religious ceremony. We amend the final decree by striking the reference to a religious divorce (paragraph “j” quoted above). See Fla.Stat.1965, § 59.34, F.S.A. As amended, the final decree is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Fleischer v. Ivy Faske Fleischer, 586 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…ish religious tradition, severing the marriage upon an authorization by the husband, which places the wife in a position to remarry within the Jewish religion. See Minkin v. Minkin, 180 N.J.Super. 260, 484 A. 2d 665, 667 (1981). In Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 233 (1967), the third district held that such a provision is unenforceable. On appeal, the husband argues that it is a violation of the First Amendment to enforce this provision. His argument might be…
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In re the Est. of Isaac Litzky v. Howard F. Ullman for the Estate of Isaac Litzky, 296 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…cord with the able probate judge’s opinion that the law of Florida now provides for only one kind of marriage, one which is entered into by the parties in good faith and in substantial compliance with Chapter 741. Cf. Turner v. Turner, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 787, cert. den. Fla., 201 So. 2d 233. Therefore, for the reason stated, the judgment appealed is affirmed. Affirmed.…
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Bloch v. Bloch, 688 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…le in the light of the [former] Wife’s changed status. [*947] However, while the court lacks authority to order the former husband to participate in a religious ceremony, Fleischer v. Fleischer, 586 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 233 (Fla.1967), we find that this provision is nothing more than a permissible reservation of jurisdiction. To prevail in any future modification request, the former wife will have to demonstrate a change…
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- Picchi v. Picchi, 100 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1958)