DIRK SCHEL, PETITIONER,

v.

CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND THE FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS

DREW, Justice.

The petitioner, claimant, controverts an order of the commission reversing in part the deputy’s computation and requiring that sums previously paid during temporary disability, in excess of compensation due for such temporary disability, should be credited against the award for permanent partial disability.

Claimant, a policeman, suffered a gunshot wound while investigating a robbery on September 22, 1962. He was temporarily totally disabled for approximately two months. He worked at lighter employment after January 4, 1963, but did not reach maximum medical improvement, with residual 25% permanent partial disability, until October 15, 1963.

During the period of temporary total disability claimant was paid his full salary pursuant to a resolution1 adopted by the *171employer City providing for continuing wages during limited periods of temporary disability; providing further that all such payments “in excess of the amount the employee would otherwise be entitled to” under the Act shall be reimbursed to the employer out of any unpaid “installments of compensation due for any class of disability.'1 (E.S.)

The commission found that the resolution conclusively characterized all payments thereunder as advance compensation, and construed F.S. Section 440.20(11), F.S.A.,2 F.I.C. Rule 9,3 to require that $577.70 paid in 1962 in excess of temporary total disability compensation allowed should be credited against the subsequent award for permanent partial disability, $42.00 per week for 87(4 weeks from October 16, 1963. This conclusion is rested in part upon the decision of this Court in Daoud v. Matz,4 holding that payments made to an employee during temporary disability, in excess of the sums due for temporary disability during such periods, might if so intended be credited against an award for subsequent periods of temporary disability.

We think the rationale of the Daoud decision, in its factual context, does not control the issue now presented. That opinion, relative to advance or prepayment of temporary disability compensation, did not treat or dispose of those provisions of the act which then as well as now make a; clear distinction between temporary and permanent disability compensation. The purpose served by the provisions for limited installment payment of compensation generally,5 as well as strict regulation of lump sum settlements,6 would, in our opinion, be gravely impaired by permitting alteration of the method of- payment to the extent contemplated by the resolution in this case.

These basic limitations in the law have been recognized and preserved in the rules of the commission requiring prior approval of lump sum or advance payments of compensation. F.I.C. Rule 16.7 We think the conceded absence of any compliance with this rule in the instant case, as well as our *172construction of the statute itself, requires reversal of the commission’s order herein.

Rule 9,8 relied on by the commission, provides only for reimbursement “to the extent of the compensation paid.” We think this provision, in the language of the statute,9 implies a limitation both as to the intent with which advance payments are made 10 and as to surrounding circumstances permitting or preventing characterization of such payments as “payments of compensation” within the theory of the' compensation law. In accord with the apparently prevailing view of courts construing similar provisions,11 we conclude that reimbursement for voluntary' advance payment of permanent partial disability compensation must be limited to payments in the amount of and within the time for disability compensation of that class ultimately found to be due.

The questioned order of the full commission is quashed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

THORNAL, C. J., THOMAS and O’CONNELL, JJ., and JOHNSON, District Court Judge, concur.