GULF SHORE DREDGING COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LEALA MAE INGRAM, APPELLEE
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Gulf Shore Dredging Company, a mortgage lender, appeals the dismissal of its foreclosure action against a married woman's separate property. The court reverses, holding that the lender established a prima facie case for an equitable lien based on funds used to satisfy a prior mortgage and make improvements to the property, despite the mortgage being invalid due to the husband's failure to join.
The court held that the lender established a prima facie case for an equitable lien. An equitable lien arises from the fundamental principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another and does not require proof of affirmative misrepresentation or wrongdoing as an essential prerequisite. The lender was entitled to an equitable lien for both the satisfied prior mortgage and the repairs or improvements, and it was not necessary to establish the reasonable value of the improvements or to file a notice of lien under the statutory procedure.
“Equitable liens necessarily involve the doctrine of estoppel; however, they are based chiefly upon the fundamental maxim of equity that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.”
Establishes the foundational principle that equitable liens rest on unjust enrichment, not merely wrongdoing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGulf Shore Dredging lent $3,100 to Leala Mae Ingram (a married woman) secured by a note and mortgage on her separate property. The husband did not joi…
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Plaintiff-mortgagee appeals an order in equity granting a motion to dismiss made by defendant-married woman at the close of plaintiff’s case in chief. The order appealed dismissed plaintiff’s action with prejudice for lack of a prima facie case to establish any lien or charge against defendant’s separate property. We reverse.
Plaintiff brought suit to foreclose a mortgage given by defendant to secure her note to plaintiff in the sum of $3100. After suit plaintiff discovered that defendant was married. Her husband had not joined in the note or mortgage.
At trial defendant denied that she had affirmatively misrepresented her marital status to plaintiff’s agents. She admitted, however, that she signed the note and mortgage for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to pay off a prior mortgage to a third party and for certain improvements or repairs to a building on the property. Plaintiff showed that it paid off the prior mortgage totalling approximately $600 and that it used the balance of the proceeds in making certain agreed improvements and *234repairs to defendant’s building. Before plaintiff rested its case in chief it moved to amend its pleadings to conform to the evidence and to include a prayer for relief based on "equitable estoppel and equitable lien” pursuant to Article XI, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. The court granted this motion. Subsequently, however, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed plaintiff’s action with prejudice.
The dismissal order recites that plaintiff .'failed to make a prima facie case for the ■establishment of a lien under the constitution or under F.S.A. § 85.06; further, that the doctrine of estoppel was inapplicable. From the recitals it appears that relief may have been denied for some or all of the following reasons: (1) lack of evidence as to the value of the improvements or repairs; (2) failure to file a notice of lien under F.S.A. § 85.06 describing the nature and value of the repairs or improvements; and (3) lack of evidence of affirmative misrepresentation or wrongdoing sufficient to create an estoppel.
Equitable liens necessarily involve the doctrine of estoppel; however, they are based chiefly upon the fundamental maxim of equity that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Phelps v. T. O. Mahaffey, Inc., Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 900. Consequently, while affirmative misrepresentation1 or other wrongdoing2 may supply additional ground or reason for imposing an equitable lien or charge, a showing of wrongdoing is not an essential prerequisite to such relief. Oates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 1932, 107 Fla. 224, 144 So. 418.
Article XI, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution provides in part: “A married woman’s separate real * * * property may be charged in equity and sold * * * for money or thing due upon any agreement made by her in writing for the benefit of her separate property * * * or for labor and material used with her knowledge or assent in * * * repairs, or improvements upon her property * *
The "labor and material” clause of the constitution has been implemented by F.S.A. § 85.06. This act prescribes a procedure for obtaining a lien or enforcing a claim against a married woman’s separate property, whether the labor or materials in question were furnished “with her knowledge or assent or pursuant to a contract in writing with her * * The procedure involves the filing of a notice of lien and the institution of suit within twelve months from such filing. The notice of lien must be filed within three months after the “entire” performance of labor or furnishing of material, unless such was performed or furnished pursuant to a contract in writing, in which case the notice may be filed at any time after execution and delivery of the written contract.
Since equitable liens or charges arise because of the absence of adequate legal remedy, relief may be denied where a claimant has failed to pursue an adequate legal or statutory remedy. Phelps v. T. O. Mahaffey, Inc., supra.3 Plaintiff’s remedy under F.S.A. § 85.06 was not adequate here because part of its claim arose out of the satisfaction of a prior mortgage to a third party, and that part of its claim was not recoverable under F.S.A. § 85.06. Defendant suffered no prejudice or harm by plaintiff’s failure to file a notice of lien under F.S.A. § 85.06 and *235no rights of third persons are shown to he involved by plaintiff’s case in chief. No limitation problem exists because plaintiff could file a notice of lien at any time since the labor and materials here were performed or furnished pursuant to a written contract. To require plaintiff either to split its cause of action or to voluntarily dismiss its foreclosure suit, file a notice of lien, bring a subsequent equity suit to enforce its claim under the notice of lien, and join in such suit its claim for the paid-off mortgage would violate fundamental principles prohibiting the splitting of claims or would depart from the fundamental maxim that once equity acquires jurisdiction it adjudicates entire controversies.
A note or a mortgage is a sufficient writing to support a suit for an equitable lien or charge under the “writing” clause of the constitution. Deno v. Smith, 1931, 103 Fla. 282, 137 So. 248, 140 So. 335; Ziegler v. Ft. Lauderdale Securities Co., 1931, 102 Fla. 346, 135 So. 838. A mortgagee who uses the proceeds of an invalid mortgage to pay off a prior mortgage against a married mortgagor’s separate property is entitled to an equitable lien or charge. Smith v. Martin, supra. Plaintiff clearly was entitled to a lien or charge to the extent of the prior mortgage, and, as indicated above, no reason appears why it should not also be awarded a lien or charge for the repairs or improvements. It was not necessary for plaintiff to establish the reasonable value of the improvements or repairs to establish a prima facie case. Defendant executed her note evidencing the full amount of the loan, $3100, and plaintiff’s agents testified without objection that $600 was used to pay off the mortgage and that the balance, $2500, was used for agreed repairs or improvements. While defendant’s note is void for some purposes, yet it is evidence that she acknowledged herself to be indebted for that amount. Oates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, supra.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WALDEN, J., and LOPEZ, AQUI-LINO, Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Rinker Materials Corp. v. The Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. OF Sarasota, 361 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 1978)…estoppel is sought. The Third District Court of Appeal answered this question in the negative, Palmer First National Bank v. Rinker Materials Corp., 348 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), creating direct conflict with Gulf Shore Dredging Co. v. Ingram, 193 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). Jurisdiction vests pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. The decision of the Third District Court is approved. Petitioners are subcontractors who furnished labor and materials to a construction project o…
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Singer v. Tobin, 201 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…ng that anyone had been guilty of wrongdoing, or that there was any obligation, or monies due and owing from any of the parties to the plaintiff. This contention has been answered in the case of Gulf Shore Dredging Company v. Ingram, Fla.App. 1966, 193 So. 2d 232, where it was held that a showing of wrongdoing wa not an essential prerequisite to the establishment of an equitable lien. The appellants’ other contentions have been considered and are found to be without merit. For the reasons stated, the final…
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Carman v. Gunn, 198 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…& Co. v. Barrett, Fla.App.1963, 155 So. 2d 409; Phelps v. T. O. Mahaffey, Inc., Fla.App.1963, 156 So. 2d 900; Frank v. Groo, Fla.App.1965, 176 So. 2d 119. See also the excellent legal rationale of Gulf Shore Dredging Company v. Ingram, Fla.App.1966, 193 So. 2d 232, concerning equitable liens. We perceive no reason why the trial Court in the case sub judice could not decree specific performance in behalf of plaintiff Carman and in the same decree impress an equitable lien upon the stock of True Realty and als…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Morgan F. Jones in Bankr. of Jacksonville Bread Co. v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127 (Fla. 1925)
- Deno v. Smith, 103 Fla. 282 (Fla. 1931)
- Oates v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 107 Fla. 224 (Fla. 1932)
- Roughan v. Rogers, 145 Fla. 421 (Fla. 1940)
- Phelps v. T. O. Mahaffey, Inc., 156 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Bernetta v. Ziegler, 102 Fla. 346 (Fla. 1931)
- Smith v. Exerdell B. Martin and Albert C. Martin, 186 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1966)
- Gore v. City of Tampa, 102 Fla. 346 (Fla. 1931)
- Ida v. Dalton and D. W. Dalton v. T. T. Camp, 141 Fla. 892 (Fla. 1940)