GRACE LEVISON, APPELLANT,
v.
MILTON LEVISON AND MILTON LEVISON, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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In this 1967 Florida divorce appeal, the wife challenges the trial court's denial of her claims for repayment of alleged loans to her husband's business, a share of mortgage refinancing proceeds, and the adequacy of alimony. The appellate court affirmed the decree, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's determinations.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the wife's claims for alleged loans and mortgage proceeds, as these were supported by substantial competent evidence. The alimony award was within the chancellor's discretion based on the wife's considerable income and assets, and if circumstances change, she may seek modification under applicable statute.
“It is well settled that the matter of allowance of alimony and child support are within the sound discretion of the chancellor based on the evidence presented and due consideration of the needs of the wife and paying ability of the husband.”
Establishes the legal standard that alimony determinations rest within trial court discretion
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrace and Milton Levison were divorcing. The trial court granted Grace custody of their minor child and ordered Milton to pay $5,000 annually for chil…
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This is an appeal from a divorce decree by the wife who was plaintiff below. The decree granted the wife custody of their minor child, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $5,000 per year for the support and maintenance of the minor child and $5,000 per year as alimony. Defendant was also ordered to pay $4,500 to the plaintiff’s attorney and ordered the defendant to transfer a certain automobile to the plaintiff. The lower court denied the plaintiff the right to recover for alleged loans and contributions to the defendant’s business and for a share in proceeds of a loan placed on their home.
The provisions of the decree as to the divorce, custody of the child, support for the child and attorney’s fees are not questioned but the appellant challenges the provisions of the decree denying her claim for the alleged loans and contributions to the business and a share in the proceeds of the mortgage and also challenges the amount of alimony which she contends to be inadequate.
As to the claim for repayment of alleged loans to the defendant’s business and for her share in the mortgage proceeds resulting from the refinancing of the parties’ home, we are unable to agree with the appellant’s contention that the decree was not supported by substantial competent evidence. No useful purpose will be served by detailing the evidence. Gaer v. Gaer, Fla.App., 168 So.2d 789.
It is well settled that the matter of allowance of alimony and child support are within the sound discretion of the chancellor based on the evidence presented and due consideration of the needs of the wife and paying ability of the husband. The chancellor can also take into consideration the income and asset's of the wife which in this case are considerable. The burden is on the party seeking to disturb such allowance to show that the chancellor abused his discretion. Abuse of discretion has not been demonstrated. Furthermore, if altered circumstances in the future make the decreed alimony inadequate for the *632wife’s needs, she may seek appropriate relief by modification under Section 65.15, Fla.Statutes, F.S.A., Rogoff v. Rogoff, Fla.App., 115 So.2d 456; Klaber v. Klaber, Fla.App., 133 So.2d 98; Heller v. Heller, Fla.App., 151 So.2d 35; Sommers v. Sommers, Fla.App., 183 So.2d 744.
No reversible error having been made to ■ appear the decree is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Myron Jay Singer v. Singer, 262 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…award for excessiveness has the burden of clearly demonstrating an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. See Sommers v. Sommers, Fla.App.1964, 169 So. 2d 496; Sommers v. Sommers, Fla.App.1966, 183 So. 2d 744; and Levison v. Levison, Fla.App.1967, 193 So. 2d 630. While the amount of alimony and support money awarded in this case appears substantial based on the Husband’s present income, there was conflicting evidence as to the Husband’s apparent income and capital assets which the trial judge resolved in fa…
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BOB v. Juliet S. BOB, 310 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…e, including the health of the wife and the prospects of the husband for contribution to her needs in the future, form a basis for an award of permanent alimony which may be appropriately modified in the future. See Levison v. Levison, Fla.App.1967, 193 So. 2d 630. As to. the award of 30% of the husband’s income as permanent alimony, we hold that such award is improper under the circumstances of this case. Percentage awards are not ordinarily productive of an end to litigation. We do not need to decide whet…
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Harrison v. Harrison, 314 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)…turn the cause to the trial court for the assessment of a higher award. We must not overlook the fact that a wife’s separate assets must be taken into consideration in determining the amount of alimony needed. See Levison v. Levison, Fla.App. 1967, 193 So. 2d 630. In the present instance, Mrs. Harrison possesses substantial funds and is not likely to be handicapped seriously in her chosen way of life during the remainder of her life. Nevertheless, if she is so handicapped at a future time and Mr. Harrison st…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rogoff v. Rogoff, 115 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Klaber v. Klaber, 133 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Melvyne Wahnish Sommers v. Sommers, 183 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Gaer v. Gaer, 168 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 151 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Heller v. Heller, 151 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)