MELIA MARCEL DAMBAKLY, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES ROONEY MASON, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1967-01-24
No. 66-252
Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and CARROLL, JJ.
194 So. 2d 35 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1967) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In an automobile negligence action, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant after the plaintiff's case-in-chief. The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of negligence and that issues of the plaintiff's contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury rather than decided by directed verdict.


Holding

The trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff established a prima facie case of negligence, and the question of whether the plaintiff should have seen the defendant's vehicle in time to take evasive action is a jury question, not a matter of law.


Key Quotes

“A prima facie case of negligence on the part of defendant was established by the evidence presented by plaintiff. It is reasonable to find from the evidence that the defendant turned onto a highway in disregard of the near presence of plaintiff's oncoming car which he should have seen and which had the right of way.”

Establishes that the plaintiff met the threshold for a negligence case, making the directed verdict error.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

On November 22, 1964, at approximately 6:30 P.M., plaintiff Melia Marcel Dambakly was driving eastbound on the Tamiami Trail (U.S. Highway 41) at 50-5…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Chief Judge.

*36HENDRY, Chief Judge.

The trial court entered judgment for the defendant, James Rooney Mason, after granting his motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case in an automobile negligence action.

Plaintiff, Melia Marcel Dambakly, testified that on November 22, 1964 at about 6 30 P.M., she was returning to Miami from Marco Island on the Tamiami Trail, which is U. S. Highway 41. She was traveling at a speed of fifty to fifty-five miles per hour and was approximately four to five car lengths behind another car which was also heading east. Though it was not completely dark, plaintiff, the car in front of her and west bound vehicles had their headlights on. Plaintiff first saw the defendant’s vehicle when it was turning from her left and already partially in her lane approximately twenty to thirty feet in front of her. In an attempt to avoid hitting defendant’s vehicle, plaintiff swerved off the highway, lost control of her car and eventually came to rest in a canal. The defendant came to plaintiff’s aid while she was in the canal.

The defendant, testifying as an adverse witness, stated that he entered Tamiami Trail from a dirt road known as Turner River Grade. At that time, he either saw or it was called to his attention that defendant’s automobile had gone into the canal.

Plaintiff submits that the trial court invaded the province of the jury in directing a verdict.

A prima facie case of negligence on the part of defendant was established by the evidence presented by plaintiff. It is reasonable to find from the evidence that the defendant turned onto a highway in disregard of the near presence of plaintiff’s oncoming car which he should have seen and which had the right of way.

The defendant argues that plaintiffs contributory negligence was established as a matter of law by her own testimony that she did not see defendant’s vehicle until it was in her lane twenty or thirty feet in front of her.

Whether plaintiff should have seen defendant’s vehicle turning into her lane in time to take some other action is a question to he submitted to the jury. Liefer v. Walton, Fla.App.1962, 140 So.2d 350.

The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom do not point to but one reasonable conclusion, thus, it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant. Brookbank v. Mathieu, Fla.App.1963, 152 So.2d 526.

Therefore, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, Inc., 610 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
    …ury. See Ferber v. Orange Blossom Center, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Hernandez v. Motrico, Inc., 370 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Sun Life Insurance Company of America v. Evans, 340 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Dambakly v. Mason, 194 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). In this case, there was evidence from which the jury could have found fault on the part of Langmead. Langmead herself testified that she had seen these elastic bands break before, and that one had actually broken on her before wh…
  • Lupoletti v. Miller, 269 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
    …ct was not the proximate cause of the crash. All aspects considered the liability issues should have been submitted to the jury and it was reversible error not to do so. Tooley v. Margulies, Fla.1955, 79 So. 2d 421; Dambakly v. Mason, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 35; Mele v. Summers, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 254. Appellant’s second point challenges the jury award of damages in the sum of $30,-000. We find no error or basis for remit-titur or reversal. [*69] The directed verdict in favor of plaintiff as concern…
  • …ble deductions and inferences from the evidence point to one conclusion. Nelson v. Ziegler, Fla. 1956, 89 So. 2d 780; Carlton v. Johns, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 670; Lupoletti v. Miller, Fla.App. 1972, 269 So. 2d 67; Dambakly v. Mason, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 35. The claims of the parties were substantially the same. The trial court was inconsistent in directing a verdict on defendants’ counterclaim for negligence and instructing the jury on both negligence and contributory negligence as to the plaintiffs’…

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw