HERBERT EDELMAN, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF MID-STATES INS. CO., APPELLANT,
v.
MAX KOLKER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case addresses whether an insured party can maintain a separate subrogation action for property damage after settling a personal injury claim arising from the same accident. The court held that while Florida generally prohibits splitting a single cause of action, exceptions exist when necessary to serve the interests of justice, and the insurer's subrogation action falls within such an exception.
The dismissal of the complaint was reversed and remanded. The court held that while Florida's general rule prohibits splitting a single tort into multiple causes of action for personal injuries and property damage, exceptions exist where necessary to serve the ends of justice, and the insurer's subrogation action falls within such an exception.
“The general rule in Florida is that only one cause of action arises out of a single tort committed on an individual, even though that tort results in damages to both the person and his physical property.”
Establishes the default rule against splitting causes of action in Florida tort law
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEdelman and Cohen were involved in an automobile accident resulting in personal injuries and property damage. Edelman's collision insurance carrier, M…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Rule Against Splitting Causes Of Action cases and more on FLexlaw
Plaintiff Edelman and defendant Cohen were involved in an automobile accident, resulting in personal injuries and property damage to the plaintiff. Plaintiff was paid by his collision insurance carrier, Mid-States Ins. Co., for property damage to his automobile and, in return, executed; a subrogation receipt and proof of losa which was receivd by the insurance com*684pany. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for his personal injuries sustained in the accident, and a verdict and judgment was returned in his favor on the personal injury claim. Thereafter, the instant case was filed against the defendant in the name of the plaintiff, for the use and (benefit of Mid-States, Ins. Co., for the property damage. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The trial court issued its order denying the motion for summary judgment and in the same order, by the court’s own motion, dismissed the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff had violated the rule against splitting causes of action. It is from that order that plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff also seeks alternatively review of his ore tenus motion to amend his complaint to substitute the name of his insurer as party-plaintiff. We will confine our opinion to that portion of the order which dismissed the complaint.
Appellant contends that the circumstances of this case remove it from the general rule against splitting causes of action, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice on such grounds.
Appellee contends that plaintiff, by moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability as res judicata, identified himself as the same plaintiff as in the previous personal injury action, and violated the rule against splitting causes of action, even though his motion for summary judgment was denied.
The general rule in Florida is that only one cause of action arises out of a single tort committed on an individual, even though that tort results in damages to' both the person and his physical property. Mims v. Reid, Fla.1957, 98 So.2d 498, for the reason that litigation should have an end and no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of suits. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized where such holding would defeat the ends of justice for the sake only of convenience to a putative wrongdoer. Rosenthal v. Scott, Fla.1961, 150 So.2d 433. The opinion in the latter case comprehensively discusses the reasons for the general rule and its exceptions, and differentiates the circumstances of that case to those in the case of Mims v. Reid, supra. In our opinion, the facts in the instant case fall squarely within the exception set forth in the case of Rosenthal v. Scott, supra, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint.
Accordingly, the order dismissing the complaint is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. COX, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…force the subrogat-ed insurer to wait perhaps several years to recover money it has advanced for property damages or to force an injured party to bring a personal injury action before the extent of his injuries is known. See also Edelman v. Kolker, 194 So. 2d 683 (Fla.3d DCA 1967) (insurer’s property damage suit brought subsequent to plaintiff’s successful personal injury suit did not violate rule against splitting); Emmco Ins. Co. v. Bankston, 163 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla.3d DCA 1964) (where insured had sued defe…
-
Eleyna McKIBBEN and Robert McKibben v. Zamora, 358 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…subrogated to the property claims of its insured may bring a suit for property damages sustained by its insured without regard to a prior lawsuit brought by the insured for personal injuries arising out of the same tort incident. Edelman v. Kolker, 194 So. 2d 683 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). Similarly, the insured is not barred from bringing a suit for personal injuries based on its carrier’s prior lawsuit for subrogated property damages arising out of the same tort incident. Rosenthal v. Scott, 150 So. 2d 433 (Fla.19…
-
Int'l Sec. Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Rolland, 271 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…, 756 So. 2d 137, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (explaining that multiple actions are not permitted under the single publication/single action rule when they arise from the same publication upon which a failed defamation claim is based); Edelman v. Kolker, 194 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) ("The general rule in Florida is that only one cause of action arises out of a single tort committed on an individual, even though that tort results in damages to both the person and his physical property."). Here, Mr. Rolla…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Valentine W. Mims v. Reid, 98 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1957)
- Murray Rosenthal and Joseph Rosenthal v. Scott, 150 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1961)