OCALA STAR-BANNER CO. ET AL.

v.

DAMRON

Citator

Cited By

• Damron v. Ocala Star-Banner, 35 Fla. Supp. 137 (Marion Cty. Cir. Ct. 1971)
  …s doctrine (1954, 376 U.S. 254) did not apply. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed at 221 So. 2d 459. The Florida Supreme Court refused to review the judgment at 231 So. 2d 822. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari at 397 U.S. 1073, and reversed the judgment at 400 U.S.__, 28 L. Ed.2d 57, 91 S.Ct. 628 (2-24-71). The Supreme Court held that the burden was on plaintiff to prove express malice, i.e., a knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth, knowing of probable fals…
• Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1971)
  …sentenced to 30 days in jail. The County Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed “for [*545] the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.” We noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U. S. 1073 (1970). We reverse the judgment against Palmer because the ordinance is so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that, as applied to Palmer, it failed to give “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated cond…
• Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (U.S. 1971)
  …ly held that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to show malice.” 221 So. 2d 459, 461. The Supreme Court of Florida refused to review the judgment, 231 So. 2d 822, and we granted certiorari to consider the federal constitutional issues presented.3 397 U. S. 1073. As the mayor of Crystal River, the respondent Leonard Damron was without question a “public official” within the meaning given the term in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. As such, he clearly fell within the rule that “prohibits a public off…