PERKINS
v.
STANDARD OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA
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Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes attorneys' fees for services performed during appellate stages of antitrust litigation.
Petitioner sought attorneys' fees for appellate legal services after success in a prior antitrust case. Both the District Court and Court of Appeals d…
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Per Curiam.
Following his success in this Court in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, the petitioner filed in the District Court for the District of Oregon an application for allowance of attorneys’ fees, pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act,† for legal services performed during the appellate stages of that litigation, both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court. The District Court denied the application, ruling that § 4 did not authorize the allowance of attorneys’ fees for services performed in connection with appellate proceedings. Petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals and simultaneously filed in that court two separate applications for attorneys’ fees for legal services performed there and in this Court. The Court of Appeals denied the latter application, believing that our mandate in Perkins, by not mentioning attorneys’ fees, was intended to preclude an award of such fees.
The District Court was in error in holding that § 4 does not authorize the award of counsel fees for legal services performed at the appellate stages of a successfully prosecuted private antitrust action. Both the language and purpose of § 4 make that construction untenable. See American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. 2d 763, cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899. The amount of the award for such services should, as a general rule, be fixed in the first instance by the District Court, after hearing evidence as to the extent and nature of the services rendered. See, e. g., Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 864. The Court of Appeals was also in error in interpreting our mandate as precluding the award of such fees for services performed in connection with the litigation in this Court. Our failure to make explicit mention in the mandate of attorneys’ fees simply left the matter open for consideration by the District Court, to which the mandate was directed.
The petitions for certiorari are granted and the judgments are vacated. No. 1556 is remanded to the District Court, and No. 1507 to the Court of Appeals, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
†
That section provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (37 total)
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Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973)…ntiary hearing is required. See Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F. 2d 981, 988-989 (3d Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 874, 27 L. Ed.2d 809 (1971). The Supreme Court endorsed the view taken here in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222, 90 S. Ct. 1989, 26 L.Ed.2d 534 (1970), a case involving the award of attorneys’ fees under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Court stated that “[t]he amount of the award for such services should, as a general rule, be fixed in the first instance by…1 / 2
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City OF Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974)…ied, 401 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 874, 27 L. Ed.2d 809 (1971).” Lindy Bros., supra, 487 F. 2d at 169. The Supreme Court endorsed this view in cases involving the award of attorneys’ fees under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222, 90 S.Ct. 1989, 26 L.Ed.2d 534 (1970), the Court stated that: “[T]he amount of the award for such services should, as a general rule, be fixed in the first instance by the District Court, after hearing evidence as to the extent and nature of service…
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Northcross v. Bd. OF Educ. OF the Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979)…court, with its greater facility for evidentiary hearings and fact-finding, should make awards for appellate services in the first instance, subject to our review. Weisenberger v. Huecker, supra, 593 F. 2d 49, Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 399 U.S. 222, 90 S.Ct. 1989, 26 L.Ed.2d 534 (1970). Services devoted to reasonable monitoring of the court’s decrees, both to insure full compliance and to ensure that the plan is indeed working to desegregate the school system, are compensable services. They ar…
Previewing 3 of 37 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (U.S. 1969)
- Am. Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930)
- Eagle Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Niagara Ferry & Transp. Co., 282 U.S. 899 (U.S. 1931)
- Directoplane Corp. v. Huebner-Bleistein Patents Co., 282 U.S. 899 (U.S. 1931)