MORRIS MORGAN FALAGAN, PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT
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Morris Falagan petitioned for habeas corpus relief, challenging the calculation of his sentence imposed after a retrial on the original charges. The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court's sentence language entitled Falagan to credit for all time served in the state penitentiary from the date of his initial commitment through the date of his new sentence, interpreting the plain language of the commitment order.
The court held that the language of the second Orange County sentence was unequivocal and entitled Falagan to credit for all time spent in the state penitentiary between July 12, 1961 and February 24, 1965. Where sentence language is clear, the court has no power to change it by speculating about what the trial judge intended.
“Where the language of a sentence is clear we have no power to change it by speculating that the trial judge meant something else.”
Establishes the court's interpretive principle that plain language in sentencing orders must be read as written, not interpreted based on presumed intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFalagan was originally sentenced in Orange County in July 1961 to 6 months to 5 years. While serving, he escaped in August 1962 and received additiona…
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The petitioner, Falagan, seeks release from the State Prison by petition for ha-beas corpus.
The relevant facts are taken from the petition and return which was filed pursuant to the writ which we issued.
On July 12, 1961, the Orange County Criminal Court of Record sentenced Falagan to a term of from six months to five years. He was confined under Commitment No. 003950. While serving this sentence he escaped on August 29, 1962. Following his capture he received a one year sentence numbered A003950 from Madison County. On February 18, 1964, following another escape, Falagan was convicted of the crime of escape by the Leon County Circuit Court. He received a one year consecutive sentence, No. B003950. On August 3, 1964, Madison sentence No. A003950 was vacated and a new trial was ordered. Pending trial he again escaped. The retrial was nolle prossed but on October 16, 1964, Falagan was again convicted of escape and sentenced by the Madison County Circuit Court to a three year consecutive sentence, No. C003950. Then, on February 24, 1965, the original Orange County sentence No. 003950 was vacated. *563At this time, the Leon County escape sentence was automatically deemed to have begun on February 18, 1964, the date it was imposed. See Helton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 616, 15 So.2d 416 (1943). This escape sentence expired on January 2, 1965, at which time the Madison County escape sentence was computed to have begun. Falagan was retried under the original Orange County information on February 24, 1965. He was convicted and sentenced by the Orange County Criminal Court of Record to a consecutive term of “six (6) months to five (5) years, less time previously spent in the State Penitentiary since 7/12/61.” The commitment number was D003950.
It is the wording of this second Orange County sentence that presents the question now to be decided. The state contends that the sentence allows credit only for time spent in the State Penitentiary under the first Orange County sentence. This would allow credit for the time served between July 12, 1961, and February 18, 1964, the date from which the Leon County escape sentence was computed. Falagan argues that he is entitled to credit for all time spent in the State Penitentiary between July 12, 1961, and February 24, 1965, the date the second Orange County sentence was imposed. The basic argument, of the State is that the trial judge probably intended to allow credit only for time-served under the original Orange County-sentence. This may be what he meant, but-he also may have meant what he said. The-sentence appears to us to be unequivocal. Where the language of a sentence is clear we have no power to change it by speculating that the trial judge meant something else.
We hold, therefore, that Falagan’s second Orange County sentence, commitment No. D003950, was for a term of six months, to five years, less all time spent in the-State Penitentiary between July 12, 1961,, and February 24, 1965.
The petitioner is remanded to the custody of the respondent, with directions to-calculate his sentence in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS, DREW and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Brumit v. Louie L. Wainwright, 290 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1973)…his release date in which he should be given credit upon his current robbery sentence for the time served under the intervening conviction for possession of firearms by a convicted felon? We think such credit should be given. Falagan v. Wainwright, 195 So. 2d 562 (Fla.1967), is dispositive of the State’s first contention. In that case, a prisoner serving a sentence which began on July 12, 1961, escaped, receiving an additional sentence therefor. He was then retried on the original charge, and this sentence i…1 / 2
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ROY v. State, 207 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…ding, or anything else; it says: Release.” The Judge was correct when he said that “the Court must he bound by what the record says that it did, rather than what the Judge intended”, as the Supreme Court observed in Falagan v. Wainwright, Fla.1967, 195 So. 2d 562: “The basic argument of the State is that the trial judge probably intended to allow credit only for time served under the original Orange County sentence. This may be what he meant, but he also may have meant what he said. The sentence appears to…
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Adams v. Louie L. Wainwright, 275 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973)…ing the escape trial.2 On the other hand, the trial judge in Lava withheld adjudication on the escape charge and accordingly did not enter a sentence order. In that situation we said we were not bound by the rule enunciated in Falagan v. Wainwright, 195 So. 2d 562 (Fla.1967), that if a sentence order is issued, and the language of the sentence is clear and unequivocal, then we are not permitted to speculate and reach a different meaning. Sub judice, a sentence order was entered and did not give any jail time…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Helton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 616 (Fla. 1943)