DEEB, INCORPORATED, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, A MARYLAND CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF AMERICAN SEATING COMPANY, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Deeb, Inc. and Maryland Casualty Company appealed an order denying their motion to dismiss for improper venue in a breach of contract suit brought by American Seating Company. The court held that a contractual provision requiring venue in Pinellas County was valid and enforceable, distinguishing between jurisdiction (power of the court) and venue (geographical location), and reversed the lower court's order.
The court held that the contractual venue provision is valid and enforceable. Venue is distinct from jurisdiction; since the contract provision relates to the geographical location of suit rather than the court's power to hear the case, it constitutes a waivable venue provision. Parties may contractually agree on venue, and such provisions are enforceable under Florida law.
“There is a clear distinction between jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the particular cause, while venue refers to the geographical area in which the defendant has the right to be sued or tried.”
Establishes the fundamental legal distinction that is central to the court's ruling
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1964, the Board of Public Instruction of Columbia County contracted with Deeb, Inc. to build library and science buildings. Deeb, Inc. executed a p…
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This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County denying the motion of appellants (defendants in the lower court) to dismiss for improper venue. The complaint was brought under Fla.Stat., Sec. 255.05, F.S.A., and filed in Hillsborough County, Florida.
In 1964 the Board of Public Instruction of Columbia County, Florida, entered into a contract with Defendant Deeb, Incorporated, to build a library building and a science building at the Lake City Junior College and Forest Ranger School. Pursuant to the contract and the statutes, Deeb, Incorporated, as principal, and Maryland Casualty Company, as surety, executed and delivered a performance and payment bond in the amount of $397,605.05. Deeb, Incorporated, then entered into contracts with American Seating Company for certain equipment to be furnished by American Seating Company.
*24The complaint generally alleges that Aunerican Seating Company did everything required of it and there is a balance due it of $10,034.74, and brings suit against Deeb, Incorporated, and Maryland Casualty Company for such amount. Deeb, Incorporated, has its usual place of business in Pinellas County, Florida, and Maryland Casualty Company has an office for the transaction of business in Hillsborough County, Florida.
Each contract between American Seating Company and Deeb, Incorporated, contains a paragraph twelve, which is as” follows :
“In the event of suit by the contractor or its surety against the subcontractor or his surety or those dealing with them, or suit by the subcontractor or his surety or those with whom he deals on behalf of this agreement, against the contractor or its surety, then the venue of such suit shall be in Pinellas County, Florida, and the subcontractor hereby waives for himself, his surety or those with whom he deals on behalf of this agreement whatever rights he may have in the selection of venue.”
The plaintiff’s suit was filed in Hills-borough County, Florida. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue and contended that the proper venue should be Pinellas County, Florida. This motion was denied by the lower court and this interlocutory appeal was commenced.
The appellee contends that the provision in the contract relates to jurisdiction and as such cannot be waived. There is a clear distinction between jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the particular cause, while venue refers to the geographical area in which the defendant has the right to be sued or tried. 14 Fla. Law and Practice, Jurisdiction, Sec. 3. Under the facts of this case the plaintiff had a choice of bringing the suit in Pinellas County, Hillsborough County, and possibly, Columbia County, Florida. The contract specified Pinellas County as the place of the litigation. Since the provision in the contract related to the location of the suit and not the power of the court to hear the case, it refers to venue and not to jurisdiction.
This suit was brought under Fla. Stat., Sec. 255.05, F.S.A. Since this statute contains no provisions with reference to-venue, the general venue provisions in Fla. Stat., Ch. 46, F.S.A., are controlling. Winchester v. State, Fla.App.1961, 134 So.2d 826. Fla.Stat., Sec. 46.04, provides for the venue of suits against corporations. This privilege of venue may be waived by the corporation. County of Okeechobee v. Florida National Bank of Jacksonville, 1933, 112 Fla. 309, 150 So. 124.
The provisions of the contract between the parties to this suit expressly state that the parties waive their privilege of venue and that all litigation shall be in Pinellas County, Florida. As stated in the case of Producers Supply, Inc. v. Harz, 1942, 149 Fla. 594, 6 So.2d 375 at 376: “It is settled law in this state that the parties to an agreement may provide therein where suit may be brought to enforce it if such should become necessary.” See also Felkel v. Abernethy, 1933, 112 Fla. 358, 150 So. 631. The parties in this present appeal waived their privilege of venue and agreed to have all litigation in Pinellas County, Florida. Under the laws of this state this provision of the contract was valid. Therefore, it was error for the lower court to deny the appellants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALLEN, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
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Gaboury v. Flagler Hosp., Inc., 316 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…e common law or under statute not containing specific provision respecting venue; however, it is not necessarily all inclusive. Stewart v. Carr, 218 So. 2d 525 (2nd DCA Fla.1969); Deeb, Incorporated v. Board of Public Instruction of Columbia County, 196 So. 2d 22 (2nd DCA Fla.1967); Mendez v. George Hunt, Inc., 191 So. 2d 480 (4th DCA Fla.1966). Such a statute may be limited by other statutes providing civil relief under varying circumstances, Stewart v. Carr, supra; Paulet v. Hickey, 206 So. 2d 29 (2nd DCA…
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Ringling BROS.-BARNUM & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. State, 295 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)…the geographical area, that is, the county or district, wherein a cause may be heard or tried. It concerns the privilege of being accountable to a court in a particular location. (Deeb, Incorporated v. Board of Public Instruction, Fla.App.2nd 1967, 196 So. 2d 22; Bambrick v. Bambrick, Fla.App.2nd 1964, 165 So. 2d 449; Stewart v. Carr, Fla.App.2nd 1969, 218 So. 2d 525) Venue is not the same as jurisdiction. (Copeland v. Copeland, S.C.Fla.1951, 53 So. 2d 637; Bambrick v. Bambrick, supra, Stewart v. Carr, supr…
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Emp'rs' Fire Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1976)…Judge, concur. . Bull v. Roy, 191 So. 2d 285, 286 (2d Dist.Ct. App.Fla.1966); Trombley v. Jennings, 189 So. 2d 516, 517 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1966); City of St. Petersburg v. Ferguson, 193 So. 2d 648, 650 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1967); Scaglione v. Best, 196 So. 2d 22 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1967). . The parties and the courts below have at all times considered that section 95.11(3), Fla. Stat., the five year statute of limitations, controls this litigation. That time span limits actions “upon any contract, obligati…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Producers Supply, Inc. v. Harz, 6 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1942)
- Winchester v. State of Fla. for the Use & Benefit of Fla. Elec. Supply, Inc., 134 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Altha Prater v. State, 112 Fla. 239 (Fla. 1933)
- Cnty. of Okeechobee v. Fla. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 112 Fla. 309 (Fla. 1933)
- Felkel v. Inez Abernethy, 112 Fla. 358 (Fla. 1933)