BOSTIC
v.
UNITED STATES
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The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the petitioner was not convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, contrary to the initial understanding.
The Court granted certiorari to review a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. However, upon review of the record, it was discovered that the pe…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Per Curiam.
We granted the writ of certiorari in this case 1 to consider whether the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had erred in holding that the petitioner had properly been convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in order to avoid apprehension for the robbery of a federally insured bank. The Court of Appeals purported to uphold a conviction for this offense, though there was no evidence that the petitioner knew of the plan to commit murder, and he had been confined in prison for several months prior to the date the murder was committed.2 The memorandum for the United States in opposition to the granting of the writ urged that the petitioner was “responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators in killing one member of the group/’ and as to this issue, relied on the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
It now appears that these statements in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and in the memorandum of the United States were erroneous, and that the facts are not as we believed them to be at the time we granted the writ. The record shows that the petitioner was neither charged with nor convicted of the offense of conspiracy to commit murder. The conspiracy count on which the petitioner was convicted did not include any charge of conspiracy to murder. Indeed, in his closing argument to the jury the prosecutor stated that the petitioner had left the conspiracy prior to the murder, when he was returned to the penitentiary.
Inasmuch as our grant of the writ of certiorari in this case was predicated on the mistaken representation that the petitioner had been convicted of the offense of conspiracy to commit murder, we now dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
424 F. 2d 951. The opinion recites that the conspiracy count on which the petitioner was convicted “alleged a conspiracy to rob federally insured banks with dangerous weapons and to commit murder to avoid apprehension for same.” 424 F. 2d, at 953. The court went on to say, “As to Bostic, although he had been returned to the penitentiary sometime before Ferguson’s murder, there is no evidence that he had renounced or withdrawn from the conspiracy.” 424 F. 2d, at 964.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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United States v. Auckland Holmes, 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971)…ates, 400 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 462, 27 L.Ed.2d 438. Pearman suggests that the grant of certiorari in that case demonstrates that he has raised a question of substance. However, we note that the Court has since entered an order dismissing the petition, 402 U.S. 547, 91 S.Ct. 2174, 29 L.Ed.2d 102, which seems to indicate that the grant of certiorari was not predicated on the same issue raised here by Pear-man. Furthermore, on the same day the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Andrews v. United States, 402 U.S.…
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United States v. Leonard Ray Blanton (81-5644), 700 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1983)…n is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Etheridge, 424 F. 2d 951, 967 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993, 1000, 91 S.Ct. 463, 885, 27 L.Ed.2d 422, 830 (1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Bostic v. United States, 402 U.S. 547, 91 S.Ct. 2174, 29 L.Ed.2d 102 (1971). A more thorough voir dire on the publicity issue would have better shown whether there was a need for a change of venue. The court had the power to change the venue to a location outside Tennessee even though B…
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Church OF Scientology OF Cal. v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1981)…anting en banc rehearing and continued in effect the panel decision because we were equally divided on the merits. . Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471, 472, 96 S.Ct. 2640, 2641, 48 L.Ed.2d 788-789 (1976) (concurring opinion); Bostic v. United States, 402 U.S. 547, 548, 91 S.Ct. 2174, 29 L.Ed.2d 102, 103 (1971); Johnson v. Massachusetts, 390 U.S. 511, 88 S.Ct. 1155, 20 L.Ed.2d 69, 70 (1968); The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 183, 79 S.Ct. 710, 713, 3 L.Ed.2d 723, 725 (1959). . Jackson v…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Bostic v. United States, 400 U.S. 991 (U.S. 1971)
- Johnson v. Mississippi, 400 U.S. 991 (U.S. 1971)
- United States v. Etheridge, 424 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1970)