ARCINIEGA
v.
FREEMAN, U. S. MARSHAL

U.S. | 1971-10-26
No. 70-5135
404 U.S. 4 Supreme Court of the United States (1971) Caution
Also reported at: 30 L. Ed. 2d 126 · 92 S. Ct. 22 · 1971 U.S. LEXIS 16 · SCDB 1971-002
Cited by 40 cases

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Synopsis

A parolee's parole was revoked based solely on his working at a restaurant-nightclub that employed other ex-convicts, in violation of a condition restricting association with other ex-convicts. The Supreme Court reversed the revocation, holding that incidental occupational contacts between ex-convicts in the course of legitimate employment do not constitute forbidden association under a parole condition and are insufficient evidence of a parole violation without additional evidence of non-business association.


Headnotes

[1] A parole condition restricting association with other ex-convicts does not apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the course of legitimate work for a common…

[2] Occupational association with fellow employees who are ex-convicts, standing alone, is not satisfactory evidence of a parole violation.

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Per_curiam
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

Petitioner’s parole was revoked by the Federal Parole Board because of association with other ex-convicts. In a petition for habeas corpus, petitioner contended that the record did not disclose any evidence in support of this conclusion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the revocation on the sole ground that petitioner worked at a restaurant-nightclub that employed other ex-convicts. 439 F. 2d 776.

The Parole Board has wide authority to set conditions, 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (a), and here petitioner was forbidden to “associate” with other ex-convicts. But the Board’s own regulations require “satisfactory evidence” of a parole violation to justify an arrest warrant. 28 CFR § 2.35. We do not believe that the parole condition restricting association was intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the course of work on a legitimate job for a common employer. Nor is such occupational association, standing alone, satisfactory evidence of non-business association violative of the parole restriction. To so assume would be to render a parolee vulnerable to imprisonment whenever his employer, willing to hire .ex-convicts, hires more than one. Absent a clear Parole 'Board directive to this effect, we cannot sustain the judgment of the Court of Appeals that on-the-job contact with fellow employees with police records is sufficient evidence of parole violation. If there is in this record other evidence of forbidden association or evidence of other parole violations, neither the Court of Appeals nor the United States has identified it.

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972)
    …t engaging in certain activities and perhaps in not leaving a certain area or locality. Violations of conditions of parole may be technical, they may be done unknowingly, they may be fleeting and of no consequence.4 See, e. g., Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U. S. 4; Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. Colo. L. Rev. 197, 229 (1970). The parolee should, in the concept of fairness implicit in due process, have a chance to explain. Rather, under Iowa’s rule revocatio…
    1 / 3
  • Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1972)
    …finition given to “associate” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary which defines “associate” as follows : To join often, in a loose relationship as a partner, fellow worker, colleague, friend, companion or ally. In Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 92 S.Ct. 22, 30 L.Ed.2d 126 (1971), the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the term “associate” as used in a federal parole condition. The Court held that the condition was not “intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts i…
  • United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1977)
    …une 1975, at 3. . The term “association” has been defined in the probation or parole context to mean something more than “merely a fleeting or casual acquaintance.” Birzon v. King, 469 F. 2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 92 S.Ct. 22, 30 L.Ed.2d 126 (1971) (“association” in parole condition did not extend to “incidental contacts” on a legitimate job for a common employer). “Criminal record” has been said to “refer to conviction for crime.” Birzon v. King, supra, 469…

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