JENNINGS
v.
MAHONEY, DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF UTAH

U.S. | 1971-11-09
No. 71-5179
404 U.S. 25 Supreme Court of the United States (1971) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 30 L. Ed. 2d 146 · 92 S. Ct. 180 · 1971 U.S. LEXIS 14 · SCDB 1971-007
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

A Utah motorist whose driver's license was suspended without a hearing based on accident reports challenged the suspension as violating due process under Bell v. Burson. The Supreme Court affirmed the suspension because the state district court, on judicial review, provided the motorist with a stayed suspension order and a meaningful hearing with the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, thereby satisfying due process requirements even though the initial administrative action lacked such procedures.


Headnotes

[1] A state may not deprive a motorist of their driver's license and vehicle registration without providing a forum for the determination of fault and a meaningful hearing ap…

[2] A hearing to determine fault for the purpose of suspending a driver's license need not involve a full trial, but must allow the motorist an opportunity to present evidenc…

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Per_curiam
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

Appellant, a Utah motorist, was involved in a collision. Both drivers and a police officer who investigated the accident filed accident reports with Utah’s Department of Public Safety as required by the Utah Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Without affording appellant a hearing on fault, and based solely on the contents of the accident reports, the Director of the Financial Responsibility Division determined that there was a reasonable possibility that appellant was at fault. Appellant did not carry liability insurance and was unable to post security to show financial responsibility. The Director therefore suspended her license. A Utah District Court sustained the Director, and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed. 26 Utah 2d 128, 485 P. 2d 1404 (1971). The proceedings were authorized under Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12-2 (b) and 41-6-35 (1953).

Appellant attacks the statutory scheme as not affording the procedural due process required by our decision in Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971).

We there held that the Georgia version of a motor vehicle responsibility law was constitutionally deficient for failure to afford the uninsured motorist procedural due process. We held that, although a determination that there was a reasonable possibility that the motorist was at fault in the accident sufficed, “before the State may deprive [him] of his driver’s license and vehicle registration,” the State must provide “a forum for the determination of the question” and a “meaningful . . . ‘hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ ” Id., at 541, 542.

Appellant submits that Utah’s statutory scheme falls short of these requirements in two respects: (1) by not requiring a stay of the Director’s order pending determination of judicial review, the scheme leaves open the possibility of suspension of licenses without prior hearing; (2) in confining judicial review to whether the Director’s determination is supported by the accident reports, and not affording the motorist an opportunity to offer evidence and cross-examine witnesses, the motorist is not afforded a “meaningful” hearing.

There is plainly a substantial question whether the Utah statutory scheme on its face affords the procedural due process required by Bell v. Burson. This case does not, however, require that we address that question. The District Court in fact afforded this appellant such procedural due process. That court stayed the Director’s suspension order pending completion of judicial review, and conducted a hearing at which appellant was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and crossexamine witnesses. Both appellant and the Director testified at that hearing. The testimony of the investigating police officer would also have been heard except that appellant’s service of a subpoena upon him to appear was not timely under the applicable court rules.

The judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …ore July 1, 1971, should not be sent back to the schools for further action. Evidentiary proceedings in the district courts in these pre-Roth situations sufficiently protect the rights granted public school teachers by Roth. Cf. Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 180, 30 L.Ed.2d 146 (1971); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 441 F. 2d 201, 208 and n. 15 (5th Cir. 1971). What we have said here, of course, would have no application to cases before district courts in the post-Roth (July 1, 1971) sit…
  • …rules, or the Commission’s failure to require proper rules. The important thing to be determined in this litigation is whether the Exchange did grant INI a hearing meeting all the applicable procedural requirements. Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 23, 92 S.Ct. 180, 30 L.Ed.2d 143 (1971). Specifically, INI complains of (a) lack of adequate notice, (b) lack of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, (c) improper mixing of the functions of the Exchange’s Committee on Securities, (d) failure of the Exc…
  • Dep't of Motor Vehicles of Cal. v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (U.S. 1973)
    …tates, or upon the equivalent provision of the California Constitution, or both. In reaching its result in this case, the California court relied primarily upon this Court’s decisions in Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), and Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U. S. 25 (1971), but also cited its own decisions in Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P. 2d 13 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P. 2d 1242 (1971); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P. 2d 122 (1970), and Cline v. Credit…

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