H. M. COVERT, APPELLANT,
v.
TERRI AVIATION, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND GEORGE BARRIE, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
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H. M. Covert appealed the dismissal of his third amended complaint against Terri Aviation and George Barrie for breach of a contract to pay a $15,000 aircraft sales commission. The court reversed the dismissal as to Terri Aviation, finding the breach of contract claim stated a valid cause of action, but affirmed the dismissal as to Barrie individually, holding that a corporate officer cannot be personally sued in tort for inducing the corporation's breach of contract.
The court held that Covert stated a valid cause of action for breach of contract against Terri Aviation and that the dismissal of that claim was erroneous. However, the court held that George Barrie, acting as a corporate representative, cannot be sued individually in tort for procuring a breach of contract by the corporation.
“In testing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well pleaded allegations must be accepted as true.”
Establishes the standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss—the court must accept plaintiff's factual allegations as true.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn June 1, 1963, Terri Aviation hired Covert to sell a DC-6B aircraft to Compagnia Dominicana d'Aviacion for a $15,000 commission to be paid upon comp…
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Plaintiff, H. M. Covert, appeals from an order dismissing his third amended complaint with prejudice as to the defendants, Terri Aviation, Inc. and George Barrie, individually
On June 1, 1963, Terri Aviation, Inc. entered into a written contract with Covert wherein Covert was hired to sell one DC— 6B aircraft N 37569 to Compagnia Domini-cana d’Aviacion. The contract provided that Covert was to receive $15,000.00 from Terri Aviation on the day that financing had been completed and monies disbursed.
In his third amended complaint, Covert alleges that on July 1, 1963, the contract was orally modified by the parties so that Covert would be paid the $15,000.00 immediately upon the signing of a contract between Terri Aviation and Compagnia Dominicana d’Aviacion, and that he did arrange for and deliver a signed contract. It is further alleged that Terri Aviation has refused his demand for $15,000.00 commission as agreed upon.
As a second cause of action, Covert alleges that George Barrie is the controlling stockholder of Terri Aviation and that Barrie did maliciously induce Terri Aviation to break its agreement with Covert. Whereby he demands compensatory and punitive damages against Barrie individually.
In testing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well pleaded allegations must be accepted as true.
The trial court correctly dismissed the second cause of action with prejudice against George Barrie, individually. Barrie, acting as a representative of Terri Aviation can not be sued in tort for allegedly procuring a breach of contract by Terri Aviation. See Days v. Florida East Coast Railway Company, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 434.
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, we hold that it does state a cause of action against Terri Aviation. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as to the cause of action for breach of contract against Terri Aviation. That portion of the order dismissing the complaint against George Barrie, individually, is affirmed; that portion of the order dismissing the complaint against Terri Aviation is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
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Nitzberg v. Zalesky, 370 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…contract of another which threatens it . . . “It is clear that a controlling stockholder of a corporation falls within the privilege when he interferes with a contract between the corporation and a third person. See Covert v. Terri Aviation, Inc., 197 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3 DCA 1967), and Felsen v. Sol Cafe Mfg. Corp., 24 N.Y.2d 682, 301 N.Y.S.2d 610, 249 N.E. 2d 459 (1969). Although the Florida courts have not decided whether interest of a mortgage lender is that of a “financial interest” within the scope of…
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Peacock v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 432 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…evrolet. On this premise, GMAC argues that it cannot in law have tortiously interfered with a contract to which GMAC itself was effectively a party. See Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Covert v. Terri Aviation, Inc., 197 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). We reject GMAC’s reasoning and hold that GMAC’s subsidiary relationship to GM does not in itself negate the possibility of GMAC’s having intentionally interfered with Peacock’s and Peacock Chevrolet’s business relationships with…
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Sloan v. SAX, 505 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…defendant is or is not to be considered a party to the contractual relationship); West v. Troelstrup, 367 So. 2d 253 (same); Paradise Shores Apartments v. Practical Maintenance Co., 344 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (same); Covert v. Terri Aviation, 197 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (same). Courts of other jurisdictions have uniformly held that (assuming all other elements are present) where an individual acts without an honest belief that his action will benefit-his employer, liability for unlawful interfer…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Days v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 165 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)