IRA D. ADAMS AND OHIO CASUALTY COMPANY, PETITIONERS,
v.
JAMES W. SHEPHERD AND FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed an order from the Florida Industrial Commission concerning the date of maximum medical improvement for a claimant. The court found that the deputy commissioner's original finding was supported by sufficient evidence and that the Full Commission erred in reversing it.
Yes, the deputy commissioner's finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
“The sole question presented is whether the finding of the deputy that claimant reached maximum medical improvement on January 21, 1965, is supported by competent, substantial evidence.”
This quote states the central legal question the court was asked to decide.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involves a dispute over the date a claimant reached maximum medical improvement. A deputy commissioner made a finding, which was then reverse…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Maximum Medical Improvement cases and more on FLexlaw
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review an order of the Florida Industrial Commission dated September 7th, 1966. The sole question presented is whether the finding of the deputy that claimant reached maximum medical improvement on January 21, 1965, is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Having reviewed the transcript of record and briefs and heard argument of counsel, we conclude that the order of the deputy is supported by competent, substantial evidence and that the Full Commission erred in reversing the deputy as to the date of maximum medical improvement.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted, the order of the Full Commission quashed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the order of the ■deputy.
It is so ordered.
THORNAL, C. J., and O’CONNELL, ■CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., dissents with Opinion.
(dissenting):
The full commission held that the deputy’s conclusion that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement on January 21, 1965 was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. I am entirely in accord with the full commission. In my examination of the record I do not find any competent, substantial evidence at all supporting the conclusion of the deputy. Moreover, his conclusion in the light of the undisputed physical facts and the testimony of the physicians who testified other than Dr. Tucker does not accord with logic and reason, a basic consideration in evaluating the findings of a deputy. I think the full commission was entirely correct when it ordered this case returned to the deputy for further consideration and I would approve the full commission’s disposition of the case for the above reasons and on the authority of Gillespie v. Anderson, Fla.1960, 123 So.2d 458.
DREW, Justice
(dissenting):
The full commission held that the deputy’s conclusion that the claimant reached maximum medical improvement on January 21, 1965 was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. I am entirely in accord with the full commission. In my examination of the record I do not find any competent, substantial evidence at all supporting the conclusion of the deputy. Moreover, his conclusion in the light of the undisputed physical facts and the testimony of the physicians who testified other than Dr. Tucker does not accord with logic and reason, a basic consideration in evaluating the findings of a deputy. I think the full commission was entirely correct when it ordered this case returned to the deputy for further consideration and I would approve the full commission’s disposition of the case for the above reasons and on the authority of Gillespie v. Anderson, Fla.1960, 123 So. 2d 458.