GINSBERG

v.

LEVITT, COMPTROLLER OF NEW YORK; FULLINGTON ET AL. V. SHEA, DIRECTOR, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ET AL.

Citator

Cited By (14 total)

• Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (U.S. 1974)
  …U. S., at 24. The clear import of this language from Swann is that desegregation, in the sense of dismantling a dual school system, does not require any particular racial balance in [*741] each “school, grade or classroom.”19 See Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U. S. 1027 (1972). Here the District Court’s approach to what constituted “actual desegregation” raises the fundamental question, not presented in Swann, as to the circumstances in which a federal court may order desegregation relief that embraces more than a…
• Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (U.S. 1977)
  …the findings of the District Court that Dayton is a racially mixed community, and that many of its schools are either predominantly white or predominantly black. This fact without more, of course, does not offend the Constitution. Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U. S. 1027 (1972); Swann, supra, at 24. The Court of Appeals seems to have viewed the present structure of the Dayton school system as a sort of “fruit of the poisonous tree,” since some of the racial imbalance that presently obtains may have resulted in some…
• Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (U.S. 1972)
  …would attend city schools. Assignment to schools would in no sense [*472] depend ón race. Such a geographic assignment pattern is prima facie consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. See Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (N. J. 1971); aff’d, 404 U. S. 1027 (1972). However, where a school system has been operated on a segregated basis in the past, and where ostensibly neutral attendance zones or district lines are drawn where none have existed before, we do not close our eyes to the facts in favor of…