IVAN V.
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK
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The Supreme Court held that the reasonable-doubt standard announced in In re Winship must be applied retroactively to cases still in the appellate process.
A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard before Winship was decided. The New York Court of Appeals held…
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Per Curiam.
The Court held in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, decided March 31, 1970, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the essentials of due process and fair treatment that must be afforded at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. In this case, on January 6, 1970, before Winship was decided, petitioner was adjudged a delinquent in the Family Court of Bronx County, New York, on a finding, based on the preponderance-of-evidence standard, that, at knifepoint, he forcibly took a bicycle from another boy, an act that, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in the first degree. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed on the ground that Winship should be retroactively applied to. all cases still in the appellate process, 35 App. Div. 2d 806, 316 N. Y. S. 2d 568 (1970). The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Winship was not to be applied retroactively, 29 N. Y. 2d 583, 272 N. E. 2d 895 (1971).* On remand, the Appellate Division thereupon affirmed the delinquency adjudication, 37 App. Div. 2d 822, 324 N. Y. S. 2d 934 (1971), and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal from that affirmance, 29 N. Y. 2d 489 (1972). We disagree with the holding of the Court of Appeals that Winship is not to be applied retroactively.
“Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.” Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 653 (1971). See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 278, 280 (1972); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293, 295 (1968).
Winship expressly held that the reasonable-doubt standard “is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence — that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law’.... ‘Due process commands that no man shall lose his-liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.’ To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.’ ” 397 U. S., at 363-364.
Plainly, then, the major purpose of the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt announced in Wins hip was to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function, and Winship is thus to be given complete retroactive effect. The motion for leave to .proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It -is so ordered.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. .
*
The Court of Appeals followed Matter of D., 27 N. Y. 2d 90, 261 N. E. 2d 627 (1970), where Winship was said not to be retroactive but that even if it were, appellant there had waived the claim when he entered a guilty plea to the charges. In that circumstance this Court dismissed an appeal and denied .certiorari in that case. D. v. County of Onandaga, 403 U. S. 926 (1971)..
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Citator
Cited By (33 total)
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State v. In the Interest of V. D. B., 270 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1972)…e doubt.” We have carefully studied the matter and conclude, as did the First District Court of Appeal, that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, and V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), control and the standard of proof required in a case of this kind is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also, State v. R.E.F., a Juvenile, Fla. App., 251 So. 2d 672. Further elaboration upon the question appears…
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In the Interest of J. D. D., Jr. v. State, 268 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)…ffect and supporting this view are the cases of In the Interest of V.D.B., Fla. App.1972, 261 So. 2d 857, and State v. R.E.F., Fla.App.1971, 251 So. 2d 672; contra, In the Interest of J., Fla.App. 1970, 241 So. 2d 439. V. v. City of New York, 1972, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659, involved an adjudication of delinquency based on a preponderance of the evidence. The case held that the Winship standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was to be given complete retroactive effect. If any reasona…
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State v. D. H., 309 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)…p.3d, 1973, 277 So. 2d 577, our sister court stated “ . . . that a trial of a juvenile partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding rather than a proceeding in which the State is parens patriae . . . ,” citing the cases of V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 92 S.Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972) and State v. V. D. B., Fla. 1972, 270 So. 2d 6. In the latter cited case, our supreme court has held the standard of proof required in a case of this kind is “ . . . ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” See, also In R…
Previewing 3 of 33 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970)
- Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (U.S. 1968)
- Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (U.S. 1971)
- Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (U.S. 1972)
- Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. California, 403 U.S. 926 (U.S. 1971)
- Hoene v. Jamieson, 403 U.S. 926 (U.S. 1971)