CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG
v.
DALLAS CLARK

Fla. | 1936-04-23
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Davis, J. J., concur., Ellis, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
127 Fla. 232 Florida Supreme Court (1936) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 166 So. 563
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

This case involves an appeal by the City of St. Petersburg after a lower court granted a temporary injunction against the city's order revoking a business license. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot because the license suspension period had already expired.


Holding

The appeal is moot because the period for which the license was revoked has expired, rendering any decision on the appeal ineffectual.


Key Quotes

“It therefore appears that when the appeal was taken, and also later when the was lodged in this court, this case had become moot.”

Establishes the court's finding that the case is moot.

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Facts & Procedural History

The City Manager of St. Petersburg revoked a business license for selling intoxicating liquors. The licensee obtained a temporary injunction against t…

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Opinion of the Court
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

The City Manager of St. Petersburg issued an order revoking or restraining for a period of two months the right of the appellee to carry on his business as a licensed retail dealer in beer and light wines on the ground that he had knowingly permitted the sale of intoxicating liquors on his premises. The appellee filed a bill against the City of St. Petersburg for an injunction restraining said City, its officers, agents or employees from enforcing or attempting to-enforce such order. The bill was filed the day after the order was made. On that day the court granted a temporary injunction or restraining order, and several weeks later the defendant, appellant here, filed an *233answer. The defendant also filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. The court made an order denying this motion. But by this time the period for which the license had been revoked or suspended by’ the City Mana-ger had expired. Nevertheless appeal was taken by the City to said order of the court and extensive briefs filed by the respective parties. It therefore appears that when the appeal was taken, and also later when the was lodged in this court, this case had become moot. The period for which the license had been suspended or had expired, and even if the order of the court the temporary injunction should be reversed it would be fruitless to the appellant.

The chancellor, in making the order appealed from may have relied upon Section 2 of Chapter 15884, Laws of 1933, which vested in the Governor the power to revoke the of any licensee under that Act who violated the laws, while the city charter was silent on the of the revocation of licenses. But as this is now a moot case, and the court is not convinced that the public interests require -a decision of the question raised, it is ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Whitfield, C. J., and Brown and Davis, J. J., concur.

Ellis, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Wells v. Cochrane, 137 Fla. 241 (Fla. 1939)
    …appellee filed a reply brief in which he makes known that the election was held on November 8, 1938 and the court’s order refusing to restrain the holding of the election is now moot as the time therefor elapsed. See City of St. Petersburg v. Clark, 127 Fla. 232, 166 So. 563; Alabama Coal Co. v. Bowden, 44 Fla. 163, 31 So. 820; Tyler v. Peacock, 98 Fla. 981, 124 So. 463; Hogan v. State, ex rel. Williams, 86 Fla. 361, 98 So. 70; Yent v. State, ex rel. Richardson, 66 Fla. 336, 63 So. 452; McCormick v. Bond, 7…
  • In the Interest of Q. J., 302 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
    …e suggestion will be dismissed. It seems to us that the present status of the case presents an obvious application of the rule that appellate courts will generally decline to decide merely abstract or moot questions. E. G., St. Petersburg v. Clark, 127 Fla. 232, 166 So. 563; Scarborough v. Schwab, 148 Fla. 450, 4 So. 2d 518; Hollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 153 Fla. 501, 15 So. 2d 175; 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals, §§ 291-292, pp. 635-638. We have considered the application of the so-called exception to that rule, under w…
  • …PER CURIAM. DISMISSED. See City of St. Petersburg v. Clark, 166 So. 563, 563 (Fla. 1936) (“The period for which the license had been suspended or revoked had expired, and even if the order of the court granting the temporary injunction should be reversed, it would be fruitless to the appellant.”); see also Casiano v. St…

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