E. H. MARHOEFER, JR., EMPLOYER AND CORPORATE GROUP SERVICE, INC., SERVICING AGENCY, PETITIONERS,
v.
ALMA D. FRYE, WIDOW OF DECEASED EMPLOYEE, DOCK H. FRYE, AND THE FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1967-05-31
No. 35485
THORNAL, C. J., and ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ., concur., THOMAS, J., and GRAESSLE, Circuit Judge, dissent and concur with CALDWELL, J.
199 So. 2d 723 Florida Supreme Court (1967) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari challenging an Industrial Commission award of workers' compensation death benefits for an employee who died of a heart attack while working as a foreman under unusual physical and mental stress. The court held that the deputy commissioner's factual findings, supported by substantial medical evidence and affirmed by the full commission, were entitled to deference and were correct under Florida law.


Holding

The court held that the award of death benefits was correct under the law and the court's decisions. The court affirmed that the deputy commissioner's findings, supported by competent and substantial medical evidence establishing causal relationship between the heart attack and the employee's work activities, were entitled to deference when affirmed by the full commission.


Key Quotes

“The findings of the deputy, in our opinion, are supported by competent, substantial medical evidence establishing the causal relationship between the heart attack and the activities being performed at the time of the attack and by other evidence establishing that the claimant was in fact engaged in duties which subjected him to unusual strain or overexertion which was not routine to the type of work he was accustomed to performing.”

Establishes the court's standard for reviewing deputy commissioner findings and the evidence supporting compensability of heart attack deaths in workers' compensation cases.

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Facts & Procedural History

Dock H. Frye, an employee working as a foreman on a multiple-story construction project, suffered a fatal heart attack while subject to unusual physic…

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Opinion of the Court
DREW, Justice.

DREW, Justice.

The petition for writ of certiorari in this case controverts an order of the commission affirming an award for death benefits under F.S.Sec. 440.16, F.S.A. The deputy found that the employee’s death resulted from a heart attack suffered while he was subject to unusual physical and mental stress in his work as foreman on a multiple story construction project.

The question of whether the employee was at the time of his heart attack “subject to unusual strain or overexertion not routine to the type of work he was accustomed to performing”1 is admittedly a close one. Nevertheless, the deputy, the fact finder, after hearing all of the evidence, concluded that the heart attack was compensable under the ruling of this Court in the Victor Wine case.3 The findings of the deputy, in our opinion, are supported by competent, substantial medical evidence establishing the causal relationship between the heart attack and the activities being performed at the time of the attack and by other evidence establishing that the claimant was in fact engaged in duties *724which subjected him to unusual strain or overexertion which was not routine to the type of work he was accustomed to performing. The full commission by its af-firmance of the deputy’s award concluded that such award was supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record.

No question of law is involved here and for us now to assert that the deputy and the full commission erred in the entry of the compensation order would be merely substituting our view of the evidence for that of the deputy commissioner, as well as finding that the full commission was in error in its conclusion that the award was authorized u'nder the compensation act and the decisions of this Court.

As in most of these heart cases the solution of the problem is not an easy one, but we feel that the deputy commissioner is in the best position to reach a conclusion on the factual issue. When such conclusions of the deputy are approved by the full commission, the petitioner here necessarily carries a heavy burden. We conclude that the award upon this record was correct under the law and decisions of this Court.3

The writ is accordingly denied.

THORNAL, C. J., and ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.

CALDWELL, J., dissents with Opinion.

THOMAS, J., and GRAESSLE, Circuit Judge, dissent and concur with CALDWELL, J.

CALDWELL, Justice

(dissenting).

Inasmuch as I find no evidence the claimant was subjected to unusual strain or overexertion or that his duties on June 16, 1964 were in any substantial manner different from his duties the day before, the week before or the month before I must dissent.

THOMAS, J., and GRAESSLE, Circuit Judge, concur.

Dissent
CALDWELL, Justice

CALDWELL, Justice

(dissenting).

Inasmuch as I find no evidence the claimant was subjected to unusual strain or overexertion or that his duties on June 16, 1964 were in any substantial manner different from his duties the day before, the week before or the month before I must dissent.

THOMAS, J., and GRAESSLE, Circuit Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Richard E. Mosca & Co., Inc. v. Mosca, 362 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1978)
    …decisions have dealt with physical strain or overexertion, there are decisions which have mentioned unusual emotional strain in conjunction with unusual physical strain as the precipitating cause of a compensable heart attack. In Marhoefer v. Frye, 199 So. 2d 723 (Pla. 1967), the deputy commissioner found a heart attack to be compensable because it was suffered while the claimant was subject to unusual physical and mental stress in his work as foreman on a multiple-story construction project. We held that th…

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