ADAM S. MILLS AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,

v.

WILLIAM G. BROWN AND OTHERS, AND THE COUNTY OF ST. CLAIR, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR

Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is brought here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois under the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789.

It appears that the legislature of Illinois,, by' a law passed March 2, 1819, granted to a certain S. Wiggins, his heirs and assigns, the right to establish a ferry, upon his own lands, across the Mississippi, near the town of Illinois.

By a subsequent act of March 2, 1839, the legislature of lilinois granted to the county of St. Clair, in that.state, and to certain commissioners in behalf of the county, the right to locate a road and ferry landing between Cahokie creek and the Mississippi river, opposite to St. . Louis. And the commissioners appointed by this law proceeded to lay out the road and establish the landing on certain lands which belonged to the plaintiffs in error; and to which, by sundry conveyances, thev derived title from the said Wiggins.

The plaintiffs in error thereupon' filed their bill in the Circuit Court of the state, praying that the county of St. Clair and the said commissioners should be enjoined from further proceedings under the act of assembly last above mentioned.. The respondents, the present defendants in error, appeared-and demurred generally to the bill; and upon final hearing of the cause, the demurrer was sustained by the Circuit Court, and the bill dismissed. From this decision the complainants appealed to the Supreme Court of the state where the decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed. The ¿points proposed to be raised here, are, 1st, Whether the act of assembly of 1819, was not a contract with the said Wiggins, his heirs and assigns; and, 2d, Whether the act of 1839 does not impair the contract. These points are not directly stated in the pleadings, nor are they noticed in the decree of the Circuit or Supreme Court of the state. Yet if it appeared from the bill, that the Court could not have sustained the demurrer without considering and deciding these points; if they were necessarily involved .in the decision of the' case, as presented by the bill and demurrer, this Court would nave jurisdiction upon the writ of error, although they are not expressly stated in the decrees to have been raised and decided.

It is unnecessary for the purposes of this opinion to state the contents of the bill. Indeed, as concerns the question before us, it could not well be understood without giving the whole bill in its own "words. It is. sufficient to say that we have carefully examined it, and are satisfied that the points proposed to be raised here, were hot necessarily involved in the judgment given by the State Court. On the contrary, we think it may have come to the conclusion that the demurrer ought to be sustained on other grounds, and that the bill was not so framed as to require a decision upon these questions.

It is true that the plaintiffs and defendants in error have both waived all objections to, jurisdiction, and have pressed the Court for a decision on the principal points. But consent will not give jurisdiction. And we have heretofore, on several occasions, said, that when the act of Congress has so carefully ana cautiously restricted the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court, over the judgments and decrees óf the state tribunals, it would ill become the Court to exercise it in á different spirit. And it certainly could not be justified in .expressing an opinion favourable or unfavourable as to the correctness of this decree, when it has not the power to affirm or reverse it.

The writ of error must therefore be dismissed.