FAUSNER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
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Commuting expenses, even if for transporting work incidentals, are personal and not deductible business expenses.
A commercial airline pilot sought to deduct the full cost of his 84-mile round trip commute, arguing it was necessary to transport his flight and over…
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Per Curiam.
Petitioner Donald Fausner, a commercial airlines pilot, who regularly traveled by private automobile from his home to his place of employment and back again, a round trip of approximately 84 miles, sought to deduct the entire cost of commuting under § 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, on the theory that his automobile expenses were incurred to transport his flight bag and overnight bag and thus constituted ordinary and necessary business expenses. It is not disputed that petitioner would have commuted by private automobile regardless of whether he had to transport his two bags. The Tax Court disallowed the deduction in toto. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court. 472 F. 2d 561.
This issue has been addressed by two other circuits, Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F. 2d 1007 (CA2 1966), and Tyne v. Commissioner, 385 F. 2d 40 (CA7 1967). Both of these circuits concluded that some allocable portion of the expenses incurred could be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow those cases on the ground that there was no rational basis for any allocation between the nondeductible commuting component and the deductible business component of the total expense.
As the Court of Appeals indicated, Congress has determined that all taxpayers shall bear the expense of commuting to and from work without receiving a deduction for that expense. We cannot read § 262 of the Internal Revenue Code1 as excluding such expense from “personal” expenses because by happenstance the taxpayer must carry incidentals of his occupation with him.' Additional expenses may at times be incurred for transporting job-required tools and material to and from work.2 Then an allocation of costs between “personal” and “business” expenses 3 may be feasible. But no such allocation can be made here.
We grant the petition for certiorari and affirm the judgment below.
Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
“Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.” 26 U. S. C. § 262.
See Rev. Rui. 63-100, 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 34.
Sec. 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §162 (a).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Ireland v. United States, 621 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1980)…the flights primarily served Ireland’s personal interests. It is established that a taxpayer’s commuting costs are an item of personal expense and cannot be deducted as business expenses under section 162, 26 U.S.C. § 162. Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838, 93 S.Ct. 2820, 37 L.Ed. 996 (1973). See Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F. 2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1964) (“[d]eeply ingrained in the whole tax structure ... is the basic proposition that the cost of going to and from home and an established place of…
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Sharon v. Commissioner OF Internal Revenue, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978)…2 T.C. 1106 (1969), aff’d per curiam, 443 F. 2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971). We also agree that allocation of these expenses between the nondeductible personal component and any deductible capital component would not be feasible. See Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838, 839, 93 S.Ct. 2820, 37 L.Ed.2d 996 (1973). Thus, like the Tax Court, we conclude that the amortization deduction was precluded by the proscription of section 262, which “take[s] precedence” in the circumstances over the amortization provision of se…1 / 2
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Moss v. Commissioner OF Internal Revenue, 758 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1985)…s permission of any other provision and even though the expense of commuting to and from work, a traveling expense but not one incurred away from home, is not deductible. Treasury Regulations on Income Tax § 1.262 — 1(b)(5); Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838, 93 S.Ct. 2820, 37 L.Ed.2d 996 (1973) (per curiam). The problem is that many expenses are simultaneously business expenses in the sense that they conduce to the production of business income and personal expenses in the sense that they raise person…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sullivan v. Commissioner OF Internal Revenue, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966)
- Tyne v. Commissioner OF Internal Revenue, 385 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1967)
- Fausner v. Commissioner OF Internal Revenue, 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973)