WRIGHT
v.
NORTH CAROLINA ET AL.

U.S. | 1974-02-19
No. 73-5679
415 U.S. 936 Supreme Court of the United States (1974) Positive Treatment
Cited by 18 cases


Dissent
Mr. Justice Douglas,

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The petitioner in this case challenges the admission at his trial for rape of certain self-incriminating statements. The statements were the result of police interrogation preceded by warnings which the petitioner asserts to be inadequate in light of the requirements enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The warning petitioner received stated in pertinent part:

“You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you if you wish, if and when you go to Court.” (Emphasis added.)

Petitioner contends that the right to appointed counsel only “if and when he goes to court” is contrary to Miranda, supra, where we said:

“This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a 'station house lawyer’ present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.” Id., at 474 (emphasis added).

The validity of warnings which advise only of some in futuro right to counsel is an issue on which lower courts are divided. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all concluded that such warnings are inadequate compliance with Miranda.

In this case the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits in holding the warnings adequate.2 State courts are also widely-divided on this issue, with Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Washington finding the warnings insufficient3 while Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, and New York have reached a contrary result.4

We are, of course, the only source of resolution for this conflict and it is our obligation to provide uniformity on such important federal constitutional questions. In reforming the Court’s jurisdiction in 1925 the purpose was to allow us to “hear and determine those cases which should alone engage [our] attention,” since under the prior law the Court was “hindered from . . . efficiently functioning in the performance of its highest duty of interpreting the Constitution and preserving uniformity of decision by the intermediate courts of appeals.” H. R. Rep. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1925). Mr. Justice Van Devanter had told Congress that the prime consideration in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction was “whether the case is of such a character that the last word, the ultimate guiding rule, should be announced by the Supreme Court, so that there may be uniformity of decision in the several circuit courts of appeals, and also uniformity of decision in the State courts in so far as Federal matters are concerned.” Hearings on Procedure in Federal Courts before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 29-30 (1924).

Because of the present conflict, the extent of one’s federal constitutional rights varies according to the State or Circuit in which the question is presented. I would grant certiorari in order to resolve the issue and provide uniformity.

Williams v. Twomey, 467 F. 2d 1248 (CA7 1972); United States v. Garcia, 431 F. 2d 134 (CA9 1970); Coyote v. United States, 380 F. 2d 305 (CA10), cert. denied,. 389 U. S. 992 (1967).

Massimo v. United States, 463 F. 2d 1171 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1117 (1973); United States v. Lacy, 446 F. 2d 511 (CA5 1971); Klingler v. United States, 409 F. 2d 299 (CA8 1969).

Square v. State, 283 Ala. 548, 219 So. 2d 377 (1968); Moore v. State, 251 Ark. 436, 472 S. W. 2d 940 (1971); State v. Grierson, 95 Idaho 155, 504 P. 2d 1204 (1972) (dicta); State v. Carpenter, 211 Kan. 234, 505 P. 2d 753 (1973); Schorr v. State, 499 P. 2d 450 (Okla. Cr. App. 1972); State v. Creach, 77 Wash. 2d 194, 461 P. 2d 329 (1969).

People v. Williams, 131 Ill. App. 2d 149,264 N. E. 2d 901 (1970); Jones v. State, 253 Ind. 235, 252 N. E. 2d 572 (1969); People v. Campbell, 26 Mich. App. 196, 182 N. W. 2d 4 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 945 (1971); Evans v. State, 275 So. 2d 83 (Miss. 1973); People v. Swift, 32 App. Div. 2d 183, 300 N. Y. S. 2d 639 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1018 (1970).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Cribbs v. State, 378 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
    …e courts have held that Miranda warnings to the effect that if a person in custody wished a lawyer, one would be appointed “if and when you go to court” were adequate. See e. g., Wright v. North Carolina, 483 F. 2d 405 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 1452, 39 L.Ed.2d 494 (1974); Massimo v. United States, 463 F. 2d 1171 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117, 93 S.Ct. 920, 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973); United States v. Lacy, 446 F. 2d 511 (5th Cir. 1971); Klingler v. United States, 409 F…
  • Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (U.S. 1989)
    …60, n. 2. The majority of federal and state courts to consider the issue have held that warnings that contained “if and when you go to court” language satisfied Miranda. See Wright v. North Carolina, 483 F. 2d 405, 406-407 (CA4 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 936 (1974); Massimo v. United States, 463 F. 2d 1171, 1174 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1117 (1973); United States v. Lacy, 446 F. 2d 511, 513 (CA5 1971); State v. Sterling, 377 So. 2d 58, 62-63 (La. 1979); Harrell v. State, 357 So. 2d 643, 645-6…
  • United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1977)
    …l, 484 F. 2d [*1221] 1350,1352 (5th Cir. 1973). Due regard must be given to the trial judge’s opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses and assess their credibility, Wright v. North Carolina, 483 F. 2d 405, 408 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 1452, 39 L.Ed.2d 494 (1974). Parker’s arguments on appeal are a substantial repetition of those made to the trial judge and rejected by him. Parker urges this court to reassess the evidence presented to the trial court and reach a conclus…

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