THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, A CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
NORMA WILLIAMS JOHNSON, RESPONDENT
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Travelers Indemnity Company sought a declaratory judgment regarding its obligation to pay uninsured motorist coverage benefits to Norma Williams Johnson, who was injured while driving an insured vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the district court's reversal, holding that disputes over the sufficiency of notice under an insurance policy are factual matters not appropriate for declaratory judgment proceedings.
The court held that disputes over the sufficiency of notice under an insurance policy involve questions of fact rather than construction of the policy itself, and therefore are not appropriate for declaratory judgment proceedings under Florida law.
“Sufficiency or insufficiency of the notice to Travelers as required by the policy, said the appellate court, was the only issue involved and such was 'not within the purview of the Declaratory Judgment Statute.'”
Establishes the core holding that factual notice disputes are outside declaratory judgment jurisdiction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTravelers issued an uninsured motorist policy to Delta Stewart. Johnson was operating the Stewart automobile when it collided with an uninsured vehicl…
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This suit for declaratory decree was commenced by Travelers against Norma Williams Johnson to secure a declaratory decree defining petitioner’s, Travelers, obligation, if any, to respondent, Johnson. Travelers had issued a policy with uninsured motorist coverage to one Delta Stewart. It was while Johnson was operating the Stewart automobile that an accident occurred when the car and an uninsured one driven by one Louise Taylor collided. Johnson who was injured in the mishap averred a claim against Travelers. Because of the claim and the requirement in the policy that written notice of injury be given, the declaratory decree was sought.
Upon denial of a motion to dismiss, the defendant filed an assortment of defenses. After testimony was taken the circuit court entered a decree favoring Travelers.
When the case reached the District Court of Appeal, First District, the decree was reversed because of the view that the dispute was one purely of fact and not a construction of the policy itself. Sufficiency or insufficiency of the notice to Travelers as required by the policy, said the appellate court, was the only issue involved and such was “not within the purview of the Declaratory Judgment Statute.” Authorities cited for the conclusion were the decision of this court in Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So.2d 338 (Fla.1952), and the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Johnson v. Atlantic National Insurance Co., 155 So.2d 886 (Fla.App.1963).
The controversy reached this court on the assertion by Travelers that the decision of the District Court of Appeal collided with decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in the cases of Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of Texas v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., *706178 So.2d 742 (Fla.App.1965), and Bacon v. Crespi, 141 So.2d 823 (Fla.App.1962).
Our study of the pronouncements of this court and of the Third District Court of Appeal leads us to the view that there is sufficient disharmony between the two decisions of the District Court on the one hand and Columbia, supra, on the other hand to vest jurisdiction here.
This attitude recalls our commitment to the rule that once we assume jurisdiction of a cause, we will settle all phases of it, Tyus v. Apalachicola Northern Railroad Co., 130 So.2d 580 (Fla.1961). However, the immediate controversy cannot be so simply resolved. The chancellor disposed of all facets which involved a determination of the facts with reference to notice to the insurer. The District Court of Appeal held that the circumstances did not justify resort to a proceeding for declaratory decree inasmuch as the whole argument sprang from interpretation of facts as distinguished from a construction of the insurance contract. So the declaratory decree was reversed and the cause remanded. We think this was done in obedience to our ruling in Columbia, supra, to which we adhere.
The attorney for the petitioner in his brief tells us with admirable candor that he just does not agree with our decision in Columbia, supra, and likes the dissenting opinion of the late Justice Glenn Terrell so much better. Indeed, he quotes from it at great length. Much as we revere our late lamented colleague, the cold fact remains that his dissent was his own and in no way affected the judgment entered in the case.
Now if we adhered strictly to the rule that once we assumed jurisdiction of a case we would dispose of all features of it, we would be in a peculiar situation. We would at once hold that the District Court of Appeal was correct when it held that the procedure followed was inappropriate and that the circuit court should be reversed for passing on the facts, and that we would pass on them nonetheless. The ruling, sound as it seems to us in most instances, does not logically fit the present situation.
So we can but state our adherence to Columbia, supra, and discharge the writ.
THORNAL, C. J., and ROBERTS, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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The Sch. Bd. OF Leon Cnty. v. Mitchell, 346 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…olving the same issues. (Taylor v. Cooper, 60 So. 2d 534 (Fla.1952)). It has also been held that where the only material issue in a dispute is of a factual nature, an action for declaratory judgment will not lie. (Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Johnson, 201 So. 2d 705 (Fla.1967)). In the field of administrative law, the battle lines were quickly drawn between those seeking to challenge agency action in reliance upon the generally accepted principle that the declaratory judgment act was to be liberally construed,…
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Higgins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 894 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2004)…t be a question regarding construction of the policy, and not only fact issues for resolution. See, e.g., Lambert v. Justus, 335 So. 2d 818 (Fla.1976); Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla.1968); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Johnson, 201 So. 2d 705 (Fla.1967); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Intercity Supply Corp., 212 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Smith v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 197 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). Thus, I would adhere to the precedent established by this long line of cases following…1 / 2
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ith § 86.031, Fla.Stat (2000). Both versions allowed for the submission of fact issues to a jury. Compare § 87.08, Fla.Stat. (1951) with § 86.071, Fla.Stat. (2000). The supreme court followed Columbia Casualty in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Johnson, 201 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla.1967). In that case, Travelers Indemnity Company issued an insurance policy with uninsured motorist coverage to Delta Stewart. See id. at 705. Norma Johnson drove Stewart’s automobile and collided with an uninsured vehicle. See id. Johnson…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tyus v. Apalachicola N. R.R. Co., 130 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1961)
- Columbia Cas. Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1952)
- Johnson v. Atl. Nat'l Ins. Co., 155 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Sanford Bacon for Marvin M. Bacon v. Eli R. Crespi, 141 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. OF Tex. v. Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 178 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)