ELIJAH RICHARDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed an order summarily denying a prisoner's third petition to vacate his guilty plea. The court found that the record did not refute the prisoner's allegations of coercion by his counsel and the judge, necessitating further proceedings.
The court held that the trial court erred in summarily denying the petition because the record did not refute the appellant's allegations of coercion. Therefore, the order of denial must be reversed.
“Although we may doubt whether the appellant can establish these charges, under the decision of Jones v. State, Fla. App.1964, 165 So. 2d 191, we are compelled to reverse this order summarily denying relief, because the record fails to refute the allegations made by the petition.”
This quote explains the court's reasoning for reversing the lower court's decision, emphasizing that the allegations in the petition were not refuted by the record.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He subsequently filed three petitions to vacate his plea. His third petit…
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Appellant seeks review of an order summarily denying his third petition, filed pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix.
The appellant first pleaded not guilty and then changes his plea to guilty, and was adjudged guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment in the State penitentiary. Subsequent thereto, he has filed three petitions to vacate under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1. He filed the instant petition [the third] alleging, in part, a new ground that he was coerced into pleading guilty by his court-appointed counsel in concert with the judge.
Although we may doubt whether the appellant can establish these charges, under the decision of Jones v. State, ■ Fla. App.1964, 165 So.2d 191, we are compelled to reverse this order summarily denying relief, because the record fails to refute the allegations made by the petition.
Therefore, the order under review is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of receiving pleadings and/or affidavits, exhibits, etc., from the State in response to the appellant’s petition and evidence on the issues as made. See: King v. State, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 440.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
ON REHEARING GRANTED
The record on appeal has been supplemented by the proceedings which took place before the trial judge on the change of plea from not guilty to guilty. The court having considered same in reference to the appellant’s contention that his guilty plea was coerced, we grant the petition for rehearing and, upon reconsideration of the order appealed, we affirm the trial court’s action denying the appellant’s third petition for relief pursuant to petition under Criminal Rule No. 1, and recede from our prior opinion dated August 8, 1967.
The record on appeal has been supplemented by the proceedings which took place before the trial judge on the change of plea from not guilty to guilty. The court having considered same in reference to the appellant’s contention that his guilty plea was coerced, we grant the petition for rehearing and, upon reconsideration of the order appealed, we affirm the trial court’s action denying the appellant’s third petition for relief pursuant to petition under Criminal Rule No. 1, and recede from our prior opinion dated August 8, 1967.
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Steinhauser v. State, 228 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…in the face of such affirmative record. See, e.g., Chisholm v. State (Fla.App.3rd 1969), 220 So. 2d 383; Lee v. State (Fla.App.4th 1967), 204 So. 2d 245; Manning v. State (Fla.App.2d 1967), 203 So. 2d 360; and Richardson v. State (Fla.App.3d 1967), 202 So. 2d 137. We now consider the first point raised by the defendant, i.e., his alibi, which, he contends, is conclusive of his innocence. As we have pointed out above, the record affirmatively reflects that the plea of guilty herein was entered intelligently,…
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Garcia v. State, 228 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…re of, or a party to any such agreement for a lighter sentence. The import of the inquiry as to voluntariness of the plea at the time it was entered was to the contrary as far as the court was concerned. Compare Richardson v. State, Fla.App.1967, 202 So. 2d 137. In the face of the clear showing of volun-tariness of the plea, in the record of proceedings at the time the plea was entered, the subsequent bare allegations by the defendant in contradiction thereof in his motion under Rule 1.850 CrPR were prope…
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Nova v. State, 439 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…efendant and could have been but was not made the subject of a prior 3.850 motion is no basis for denying relief. Whitney v. State, 184 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), and cases collected therein; Lawson v. State, 231 So. 2d 205; Richardson v. State, 202 So. 2d 137; Weeks v. State, 201 So. 2d 764; Hall v. State, 183 So. 2d 277. No matter how many prior applications for collateral relief a prisoner has made, the prisoner is entitled to consideration of his application if it presents a different ground for relie…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- King v. State, 157 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Jones v. State, 165 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)