WAUGH
v.
GRAY, CORRECTIONAL SUPERINTENDENT

U.S. | 1975-06-16
No. 74-6195
422 U.S. 1027 Supreme Court of the United States (1975) Caution
Cited by 26 cases
Topics
Double Jeopardy Clause

Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Double Jeopardy Clause cases and more on FLexlaw

Dissent
Mr. Justice Brennan,

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

On November 15, 1969, petitioner was arrested in connection with a burglary in Amberly Village, Ohio. When arrested, he was in possession of a black purse from the burglarized home. On November 17, 1969, petitioner was convicted in Cincinnati Municipal Court of receiving or concealing the black purse. He was sentenced to 30 days in the workhouse, and $55 in fines and costs were imposed.

After serving the sentence and paying the fines and costs, petitioner was indicted and convicted of burglary in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. The prosecution’s crucial evidence was the black purse. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of five to 30 years’ imprisonment.

After exhausting available state-court remedies, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, contending that his conviction for burglary violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although the District Court found that both of petitioner’s convictions arose out of “a single transaction,” the petition was denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 508 F. 2d 845.

The two charges leveled against petitioner clearly arose out of the same criminal transaction or episode, yet they were tried separately. In that circumstance, we should grant certiorari and reverse the burglary conviction. I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the joinder at one trial, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, of “all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

See Wells v. Missouri, 419 U. S. 1075 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement); Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

See also People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N. W. 2d 222 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442, 497 P. 2d 1191 (1972); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A. 2d 432, vacated and remanded, 414 U. S. 808 (1973), adhered to on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A. 2d 854 (1974); State v. Gregory, 66 N. J. 510, 333 A. 2d 257 (1975).

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (26 total)

  • Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n & Attorney Gen. of United States & Superintendent Fed. Prison, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978)
    …ses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.” . See, e. g., Brown v. United States, 508 F. 2d 618, 627 (3d Cir. 1975) (affirming limitation of class in part) cert. denied 422 U.S. 1027, 95 S.Ct. 2621, 45 L.Ed.2d 684 (1975); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F.Supp. 1091, 1098-99 (E.D.Pa. 1970) (three-judge court, limiting class sua sponte) aff’d in part, 405 U.S. 191, 92 S.Ct. 767, 31 L.Ed.2d 138 (1972); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice…
  • United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980)
    …he court. E. g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975). The court’s authority to punish or coerce compliance is not, however, without limitation. United States v. Abascal, 509 F. 2d 752 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027, 95 S.Ct. 2621, 45 L.Ed.2d 684 (1975); United States v. Alter, 482.F. 2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973). The court’s powers are defined by statute and limited by the requirements of due process. This appeal requires us to ascertain the nature of the court's p…
    1 / 2
  • Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1983)
    …tion. We conclude that Perez has not made the “threshold” showing that DelCostello established a new principle of law so as to bar its retroactive application to Perez’s claim. Brown v. United States, 508 F. 2d 618, 622 (3d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027, 95 S.Ct. 2621, 45 L.Ed.2d 684 (1975); accord Service Employees, 670 F. 2d at 413. At the time Perez’s cause of action accrued, both this court and the Supreme Court had left open the possibility that Vaca-Hines actions would be governed by a shorte…

Previewing 3 of 26 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw