CITY OF MIAMI, APPELLANT,
v.
S. R. STERBENZ, APPELLEE
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The court held that the challenged provisions of the City of Miami charter and ordinance were void for vagueness and ambiguity, violating free speech rights.
Plaintiff, an assistant city attorney in classified service, sought to enjoin enforcement of a city charter provision and ordinance prohibiting employ…
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The City of Miami, defendant below, is appealing a summary final decree passing on the validity1 of a statute, entered for *5the plaintiff Sterbenz in a proceeding by him for declaratory and' injunctive relief.
The complaint, so far as here material, attacked the validity of a portion of Section 69, Chapter 10847, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1925 (the Charter of the City of Miami), and City Ordinance 6945, both stating as follows:
“ * * * No officer or employee of the City shall directly or indirectly solicit or receive or be in any manner concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political party or any political purpose whatever. No person holding a position in the classified service shall take part in political management or affairs or in political campaigns further than to cast his vote or express privately his opinion.”
Plaintiff, an assistant city attorney in classified municipal services, sought to enjoin any action by respondent pursuant to, or in enforcement of, the above provisions. The court held the complaint presented a justiciable claim for declaratory relief, based on plaintiff’s statement that he would be a candidate for the state legislature in the next election. The decree found the quoted portion of Sec. 69 of Chapter' 10847, together with the ordinance incorporating same in civil service regulations, to be “fundamentally in violation of the free speech and related rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.” The first provision, that employees shall not make, solicit or receive contributions for any political purpose, or “be in any manner concerned” with such activity, was held to be invalid for ambiguity, being too broad and vague to be sustained under principles applied to similar provisions in-other jurisdictions.2
We find these conclusions to be well supported by both reason and precedent. In an earlier reference to the same city charter provision this Court noted:
“The City Charter does not attempt to define what constitutes taking part in a political campaign such as it purposes to inhibit. Some practices the Legislature may unquestionably forbid, but when it does it must provide a yard stick to measure them by. It cannot leave that to the unbridled discretion of those who would tar and feather any who dared oppose them. Freedom of suffrage and political expression are as essential as freedom of the press. * * * ”3
A study of federal and state legislation and decisions in this area 4 indicates substantial distinctions, in terms and definition of the limitations imposed, between the provisions here in question and those which have been previously upheld.
While it is clear that the right of political candidacy claimed by plaintiff is not under the law of this state accorded absolute constitutional protection,5 it is equally clear that the decision in this case does not turn on that issue. Plaintiff contended, and we sustain the decree rendered accordingly, that the provisions of the charter and ordinance are bn their face void and ineffective for the reasons above stat*6ed. We here simply hold that the particular language of the quoted statute is not sufficiently definitive to effect a prohibition against candidacy for public office by an employee in the classified service. A reasonably specific statute may well produce a different result.6
In the absence of any valid severable restriction, plaintiff was in our opinion properly granted injunctive relief in this proceeding.
Affirmed.
CALDWELL, C. J., and THOMAS, THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ„ concur.
ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ., dissent.
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Clark Merrill v. City OF Miami, 203 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1967)…certified copy thereof, together with the instant record, shall be returned to this Court for appropriate disposition. See, State v. Bruno, 104 So. 2d 588 (Fla.1958). We retained jurisdiction of the related case of City of Miami v. Sterbenz, Fla., 203 So. 2d 4, opinion filed October 11, 1967. There the Chancellor expressly passed directly on the validity of the subject statute. In returning the instant case to the trial court, we refer the Chancellor to our opinion in Sterbenz, supra. It is so ordered.…
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Swinney v. Royal J. Untreiner, 272 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1973)…t. Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. U. S. Civil Service Comm., 346 F.Supp. 578 (D.C.D.C.1972). . See cases cited footnote 5, supra; 8 A.L.R.Fed. 343 (1971). . Laws of Florida, § 23, Chapter 67-1370 (1967). . 346 F.Supp. 578 (D.C.D.C.1972). . 203 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1967). . 28 A.L.R.2d 717 (1969). . 309 F.Supp. 40, 45 (D.C.N.D.Cal. (1969). . The employee, Fishkin, was an administrative analyst with the Contra Costa County Social Service Department. His job was to arrange for office space, desks and tel…1 / 2
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Int'l Ass'n OF Fire Fighters v. City OF Miami Beach, 36 Fla. Supp. 200 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1972)…at the ordinance in question is constitutionally valid. However, there has been no intimation of a compelling state interest for the broad restrictions on political activity which the court finds the ordinance imposes. In City of Miami v. Sterbenz, 203 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1967), the Florida Supreme Court had occasion to consider an almost identical ordinance to the one here in question. The Supreme Court held that the provision of the ordinance that city employees shall not make, solicit or receive contribution…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United Pub. Workers of Am. (c. I. O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (U.S. 1947)
- Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 156 Fla. 682 (Fla. 1945)
- Jones v. Bd. OF Control of the State of Fla., 131 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1961)
- Dresner v. City OF Tallahassee, 134 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1961)
- State v. Stuler, 122 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1960)