CHARLES FOSTER BROWN AND GEORGE G. HUNTER, JR., APPELLANTS,
v.
LEE P. HENRICH, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reverses summary judgment dismissing a suit on a New York judgment for attorney fees. The court holds that under New York's long-arm statute (CPLR 302), jurisdiction over a defendant who was domiciled in New York when services were rendered but became a non-domiciliary by the time of service is proper, as clarified by the New York Court of Appeals in State v. Davies.
The court holds that CPLR 302 does apply to a defendant domiciled in New York when the business transaction occurred, even if the defendant was a non-domiciliary at the time of service. The New York Court of Appeals in State v. Davies resolved prior confusion in New York law by establishing this principle, and Florida courts must apply the law prevailing at the time of appellate decision.
“CPLR 302 does apply to a defendant who was domiciled in New York at the time he transacted the business but a non-domiciliary at the time of service”
Establishes the holding that the long-arm statute applies despite change in domiciliary status between transaction and service
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs Brown and Hunter, both attorneys, rendered professional services to defendant Henrich while Henrich was domiciled in New York. Henrich subs…
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This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Charles F. Brown and George G. Hunter, Jr., from a summary final judgment entered in favor of defendant, Lee P. Henrich. We reverse.
Plaintiffs are attorneys and rendered professional services to defendant while he was a domiciliary of New York. Defendant subsequently moved to Florida. Plaintiffs then obtained a New York judgment against defendant for the amount due for their services. Jurisdiction of the New York court was based on New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 302,1 which provides for personal jurisdiction of a non-domiciliary who has transacted business in the state. Personal service was had upon defendant in Florida pursuant to New York CPLR 313.2
The present action is a suit on the New York judgment. The trial court entered a summary judgment for defendant, finding that under New York law CPLR 302 did not apply to a defendant who was a domiciliary of New York at the time of the business transaction but who was a non-domiciliary at the time of service.
There has been some confusion in the New York law as to whether or not CPLR 302 would apply to a non-domiciliary who was domiciled in New York at the time of the transaction in question. Since the ruling of the trial court the question has been resolved. The New York Court of Appeals ruled in State v. Davies, 1966, 18 N.Y.2d 950, 277 N.Y.S.2d 146, 223 N.E.2d 570, that CPLR 302 does apply to a defendant who was domiciled in New York at the time he transacted the business but a non-domiciliary at the time of service.
Inasmuch as an appellate court must apply the law prevailing at the time it renders its decision, Florida East Coast Ry. v. Rouse, Fla.1966, 194 So.2d 260, the judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court to grant plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
Reversed.
WALDEN, C. J., and BEASLEY, THOMAS D., Associate Judge, concur.
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Coleman v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. OF Fla., 228 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…on instructions. However, the ultimate determination of this ease should be decided on the state of the law as it exists at the present time. See: Florida East Coast Railway Company v. Rouse, Fla.1967, 194 So. 2d 260; Brown v. Henrich, Fla.App.1967, 203 So. 2d 183.…
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Henrich v. Brown, 212 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1968)…PER CURIAM. Upon consideration of the petition, briefs and oral argument in this cause we conclude that the writ of certiorari was improvidently issued and should be discharged, Fla.App., 203 So. 2d 183. It is so ordered. CALDWELL, C. J., and THOMAS, DREW, THORNAL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.…
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- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Rouse, 194 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1966)