ALLIE JUNE HELLWEG, APPELLANT,
v.
VIRGIL HOLMQUIST, APPELLEE
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A guest passenger sued a driver for negligence after a collision on the Melbourne Causeway. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiff's deposition and counter-affidavit. The appellate court reversed, holding that whether the driver's conduct constituted gross negligence under Florida's guest statute is ordinarily a question for the jury and cannot be resolved by summary judgment when facts show the driver took his eyes off the road on a bridge.
Summary judgment was improper. Whether the driver's conduct constituted gross negligence under the guest statute is ordinarily a jury question that depends on the particular circumstances, including the location (bridge), time, traffic conditions, and other factors affecting travel. Taking one's eyes off the road can constitute gross negligence, but determining whether it does in this case requires the jury to resolve the factual circumstances.
“Gross negligence, mentioned in the "guest statute", is that course of conduct which a reasonable and prudent man would know would probably and most likely result in injury to passengers riding in his vehicle.”
Defines the legal standard for gross negligence that must be satisfied to avoid the guest statute defense
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff was a guest passenger in defendant's automobile on the Melbourne Causeway, which crosses Indian River. While driving on the bridge portion, …
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This appeal brings for review a final judgment for defendant upon a motion for summary judgment in a personal injury action.
Plaintiff was a guest passenger in defendant’s automobile, and it was upon her explanation of the occurrence, given in a deposition and a counter-affidavit, that the final judgment was entered.
Plaintiff explained that defendant was driving his automobile, with plaintiff a passenger, over “Melbourne Causeway”, which crosses Indian River in Brevard County. Defendant was proceeding upon a bridge spanning a portion of the waterway when he noticed a motor truck moving in the same direction a short distance ahead. Defendant recognized the truck as one belonging to him. He called plaintiff’s attention to the truck and remarked that he owned it. In doing so, defendant took his eyes from the roadway and glanced around to face plaintiff. By the time defendant looked again in the direction of his travel he could not avoid striking the truck.
“Gross negligence”, to which reference is made in the “guest statute” (F. S.A. § 320.59), is a relative term to be understood as meaning a greater want of care than is implied from the term “ordinary negligence”. The circumstances of each particular case must be taken into account. Ordinary or simple negligence is that course of conduct which a reasonable and prudent man would know might possibly result in injury to persons or property, whereas gross negligence, mentioned in the “guest statute”, is that course of conduct which a reasonable and prudent man would know would probably and most likely result in injury to passengers riding in his vehicle. To put it another way, the act complained of must be of such character that the driver of the vehicle would know, or should know, that by doing the act in the manner and at the time in question he placed those riding with him in danger of injury. Carraway v. Revell, Fla. 1959, 116 So.2d 16.
This is a lesser degree of negligence than will support a charge of manslaughter. Carraway v. Revell, supra; Rodriguez v. Gonzalez, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 848.
There is frequently a greater hazard in proceeding in a motor vehicle over a *211bridge which spans a waterway than is encountered in ordinary travel. Those operating motor vehicles under such circumstances are called upon to exercise greater caution, depending upon conditions affecting travel at the time.
It has been held that the conduct of the operator of a motor vehicle in turning his head around to talk with a passenger, thereby taking his eyes off the road, could constitute “gross negligence”. Farrey v. Bettendorf, Fla. 1957, 96 So.2d 889; Farrey v. Bettendorf, Fla.App.1960, 123 So.2d 558.
Summary judgment disposing of the whole case upon the facts may be invoked only when no genuine issue as to any material facts remains and all essential facts are beyond dispute. Such a state of affairs is seldom found in tort actions because of the well-settled principle that questions of negligence, gross negligence, and willful or wanton misconduct, and the question of proximate cause, ordinarily are to be resolved by the trier of the facts from the circumstances in each particular case. What might be ordinary negligence in the operation of an automobile under one set of circumstances might constitute gross negligence under other circumstances depending upon the time, location, amount of traffic, physical conditions, and all other elements that affect travel.
The record now before the court presents a case governed by this latter principle and indicates that the final judgment should be reversed with directions to let the case proceed to trial. See, also, Cadore v. Karp, Fla.1957, 91 So.2d 806; Foy v. Fleming, Fla.App.1964, 168 So.2d 177; Haynes v. Little ford, Fla.App.1965, 173 So.2d 477.
Reversed.
PIERCE, WILLIAM C., . Associate Judge, concurs.
WALDEN, C. J., dissents without opinion.
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Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)…79 So. 2d 679; Le Fevre v. Bear (Fla.App.2d 1959), 113 So. 2d 390; and Myers v. Korbly (Fla.App.2d 1958), 103 So. 2d 215. . See, Myers v. Korbly, id. See, also, 3 Fla.Jur., Automobiles § 123. . See, e. g., Hellweg v. Holmquist (Fla.App. 4th 1967), 203 So. 2d 209; and Farrey v. Bettendorf (Fla.App.3d 1960), 123 So. 2d 558, in which the drivers of the vehicles involved, being chargeable with awareness of the clear and present danger, turned their attention from the road to engage in protracted conversation wi…
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Leib v. City OF Tampa, 326 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…issue of proximate cause is inappropriate for determination by summary judgment since the question generally must be resolved by the trier of fact from all of the facts and circumstances in a particular case. Hellweg v. Holmquist, Fla.App.4th 1967, 203 So. 2d 209. Even if Shell’s act of driving through downtown Tampa at a high rate of speed is regarded as an intervening cause of the accident, the first wrongdoer may still be held liable if such an intervening cause was foreseen or reasonably might have been…
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BDO Seidman v. Banco Espirito Santo Int'l, 38 So. 3d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…he circumstances and in the light of all the related factors taken collectively might well establish the existence of gross negligence-(emphasis added). Madden v. Killinger, 97 So. 2d 205, 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957). Similarly, in Hellweg v. Holmquist, 203 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), also cited by Banco, a driver’s gross negligence in an automobile accident was said to depend upon “the time, location, amount of traffic, physical conditions, and all other elements that affect travel.” While an accountin…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Royal Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959)
- Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1957)
- McCRORY v. Kelly, 91 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1956)
- Cadore v. Karp, 91 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1957)
- FOY v. Fleming, 168 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Rodriguez v. Gonzalez, 157 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Sula P. Haynes v. Littleford, 173 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Farrey v. Bettendorf, 123 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)