NICHOLAS CAPPETTA, PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT
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Nicholas Cappetta sought habeas corpus relief challenging his five-year sentences for breaking and entering, possessing burglary tools, and escape. The Florida Supreme Court rejected his claims of double jeopardy, inadequate counsel preparation time, and defects in grand jury indictment, finding no grounds for relief and discharging the writ.
The court rejected all grounds for habeas corpus relief. The alleged prior acquittal was disproved by the clerk's certificate. Claims regarding self-incrimination and failure to appear before a committing magistrate were deemed abandoned. Inadequate counsel preparation time was rejected because counsel was privately retained and the trial was postponed from January 3 to January 10, 1963. The failure to obtain a grand jury indictment does not state grounds for relief.
“Petitioner's allegation that on October 2, 1962, he was acquitted in Case No. 62-5350 and subsequently convicted in the same case is disproved by the certificate of the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Record, Dade County”
Establishes that the petitioner's core claim of double jeopardy via prior acquittal was factually unsupported by the official record.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCappetta was sentenced on January 10, 1963, in Dade County to five years for breaking and entering and consecutively five years for possessing burglar…
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This cause is before us on petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release of petitioner who is presently serving a five-year sentence for breaking and entering (Case No. 62-5350) imposed January 10, 1963, by the Criminal Court of Record, Dade County. On the same date, petitioner received a consecutive sentence of five years in Case No. 62-5584 for possessing burglary tools. On September 28, 1966, the Court of Record, Broward County, sentenced petitioner to five years for escape. The convictions in Cases Nos. 62-5350 and 62-5584 were affirmed on appeal.1 Petitioner contends he was previously, on October 2, 1962, tried in Case No. 62-5350 and acquitted.
Petitioner’s first motion to vacate, alleging he was not indicted by a grand jury, *610was denied March 31, 1964. His second motion to vacate filed July 13, 1966, stated as grounds: (1) double jeopardy, (2) self-incrimination by virtue of being placed in a line-up and (3) no appearance before a committing magistrate. This motion was denied September 22, 1966, but the order of denial was not received by petitioner until January 10, 1967, too late for appeal.
We issued the writ and have considered the return and supplemental return of respondent, as well as the petition and reply brief of petitioner. Because petitioner did not receive notice of the denial of his second motion to vacate until too late to appeal, a fact admitted by respondent, we have considered the merits of the motion to vacate filed July 13, 1966.2
Petitioner’s allegation that on October 2, 1962, he was acquitted in Case No. 62-5350 and subsequently convicted in the same case is disproved by the certificate of the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Record, Dade County, attached as Exhibit “I” in respondent’s supplemental response. The other points raised by the motion to vacate, (self-incrimination, and failure of the officers to take petitioner before a committing magistrate,) are not raised on habeas corpus in this court and must be deemed abandoned.
Additional points raised here for the first time are: (1) That inadmissible testimony was introduced into evidence at the trial; (2) that defendant’s counsel had inadequate time to prepare the case; (3) that petitioner was not indicted by grand jury. Points One and Three do not state grounds upon which relief may be granted.3
As to Point Two, the record shows that petitioner was represented at the trial by the same privately retained counsel who previously represented him in other cases. Petitioner alleges that the record is incorrect and he was in fact represented by another attorney who was retained by him the night before the January 3, 1963 date set for trial and that the attorney requested but was denied a continuance. However, the trial was subsequently postponed until January 10, 1963. It has been held that the mere fact that counsel is appointed the day of the trial does not establish deprivation of a fair trial,4 and that one may not contest the competency of privately retained counsel.5 Petitioner does not contend the failure to retain counsel until the day before the date set for trial was attributable to other than his own neglect.6
Accordingly, writ of habeas corpus is discharged.
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, ROBERTS, DREW and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (36 total)
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Clement Lemmon Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…ineffective counsel, the trial court was in error. Lastly, since the trial court may have based its summary denial on the proposition that Edwards had no legal right to attack the competence of retained counsel, see, e. g., Cappetta v. Wainwright, 203 So. 2d 609 (Fla.1967), we point out that the fact that Edwards’ counsel was of his own choosing is no longer an impediment to relief.4 Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra; Blatch v. State, 389 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Spencer v. State, 389 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1st DCA…
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Douglas v. State, 373 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1979)…ective” because he failed to persuade the trial judge to follow rather than override the jury’s recommendation. Finally, counsel for appellant concedes that, in order to prevail on this issue, wé must overrule our decision in Cappetta v. Wainwright, 203 So. 2d 609 (Fla.1967), recently approved without comment in Hardin v. Wainwright, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla.1978). No basis for now rejecting Cappetta is suggested, however. Appellant’s final argument (Issue III) is that a sentence of death imposed by a trial cour…
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Vagner v. Louie L. Wainwright, 398 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1981)…ineffectiveness of retained counsel as a ground for collateral attack on the judgment of conviction. In accordance with its position taken there, the respondent moved for rehearing of this cause and urges that we recede from Cappetta v. Wainwright, 203 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1967). In Cappetta, the Court said, “It has been held . .. that one may not contest the competency of privately retained counsel.” Id. at 610. This statement from Cappetta has been the basis for numerous decisions of the district courts of ap…
Previewing 3 of 36 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60 (Fla. 1927)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Richard W. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1964)
- State v. Barton, 194 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1967)
- Everett v. State, 161 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Jackson v. State, 166 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- King v. Louie L. Wainwright, 368 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966)
- Kirkland v. State, 165 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Ziegler v. State, 180 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Henderson v. State, 174 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Burke v. State, 160 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)