LORENZO DOUGLAS REED, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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This case involves an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside a conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. The appellant argued his guilty plea was involuntary due to his codefendant's confession, but the court found the plea was voluntary and part of a negotiated agreement.
No, the appellant's guilty plea was voluntary and was made as part of a properly negotiated plea agreement where the State abandoned another pending count.
“This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's postconviction motion to set aside a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence on a charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny.”
Describes the nature of the appeal and the lower court's decision being reviewed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Reed was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny, along with other offenses. He pled guilty to one charge whi…
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This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s postconviction motion to set aside a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence on a charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny.
The appellant and a codefendant were charged with the joint commission of said crime, together with another count charging a separate offense. In the trial court’s order denying the Rule One motion, it is stated that appellant pled guilty to the one charge while represented by the Public Defender’s Office. Appellant’s motion and briefs concede this representation, but claim that the plea of guilty was not voluntary because it was coerced by the knowledge that his codefendant had confessed; and, therefore, in those circumstances there was nothing else the appellant could do but confess.
Under the record before us, it is clear that the appellant’s plea of guilty was voluntary and was made in furtherance of a properly negotiated plea resulting in the abandonment of the other pending count by the State. Hield v. State, Fla.App. 4th, 201 So.2d 235, 1967; Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966).
Affirmed.
WIGGINTON, C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., and SPECTOR, TJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Weathington v. State, 262 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…to the record, what actually occurred is that appellant’s co-actor in the crime pleaded guilty after a properly negotiated plea bargain and received a five year sentence. See Jones v. State, Fla.App.1970, 237 So,2d 249; Reed v. State, Fla.App.1967, 204 So. 2d 26; also see Rule 3.170, R.Cr.P., 33 F.S.A.; American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice (1968). Appellant, on the other hand, denied that he was the person involved, pleaded not guilty, was found guilty by a jury, and wa…
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Williams v. State, 259 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)…. State, 274 N.E.24 523 (Ind. 1971); and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, (1970). . Beaty v. Neil, 467 S.W. 2d 844 (Tenn.Ct.Cr.App.1971). . Kelly v. State, 254 So. 2d 22, 24 (1 Fla. App. 1971). . Reed v. State, 204 So. 2d 26 (1 Fla.App.1967); and Busby v. Holman, 356 F. 2d 75 (5th Cir.1966). . He further testified: “I prosecuted Mm (Williams) on a subsequent offense of breaking into another hardware store, but not this case.” . A certified copy of his commission was i…
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King v. State, 233 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)…larceny and the charge of committing a crime against nature then pending against the defendant. A plea of guilty, otherwise voluntarily made, is not rendered involuntary under the circumstances we have outlined above. Reed v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 204 So. 2d 26; Hield v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So. 2d 235. Although appellant does not suggest that the guilty pleas were rendered involuntary for any other reason, we gratuitously add the comment that our examination of the reported proceedings held at the tim…
Authorities Cited
- Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966)
- Hield v. State, 201 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)