GILMORE
v.
UTAH
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Gary Mark Gilmore sought a stay of his execution in Utah, challenging the validity of his waiver of the right to appeal his death sentence. The Supreme Court granted a temporary stay pending Utah's response to the application, requiring the state to file briefs and transcripts addressing whether Gilmore's waiver was valid, though three justices would have denied the stay entirely.
© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
State of Utah is requested to file prior to 5 p.m., e.s.t., Tuesday, December 7, 1976, a response to application for stay of execution filed December 2, 1976, particularly with respect to the allegations of said application bearing upon the validity of Gary Mark Gilmore’s waiver of his right to appeal, and to file with said response, unless impossible or wholly impractical, a transcript of the hearing held on November 1, 1976, on the motion for a new trial, a transcript of the proceedings of November 10, 1976, before the Utah Supreme Court, a transcript of the proceedings before the Board of Pardons on November 30, 1976, and a transcript of the proceedings of December 1, 1976, before the sentencing judgment at which a date for execution of the sentence was set. The State’s response may be filed separately from and prior to the filing of the transcripts should the State care to do so. Application for stay of execution granted pending filing of said response and further action of the Court on the application for stay.
The Chief (Jtjstice, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and Mr. Justice Stevens would deny the stay.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (U.S. 1986)…k and file. I had always thought it was a major purpose of state-imposed party primary requirements to protect the general party membership against this sort of minority control. See Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 843 (Conn.), summarily aff’d, 429 U. S. 989 (1976). Second and more important, however, even if it were the fact that the majority of the Party’s members wanted its candidates to be [*237] determined by outsiders, there is no reason why the State is bound to honor that desire — any more than…1 / 3
-
Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LA Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (U.S. 1981)…iscussed, the National Party’s rule requiring public affiliation for primary voters is not itself an unconstitutional interference with voters’ freedom of association. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (Conn.) (three-judge court), summarily aff’d, 429 U. S. 989 (1976). But these cases do support the State’s interest in promoting free voter participation by allowing private party affiliation. The State of Wisconsin has determined that some voters are deterred from participation by a public affiliation requi…
-
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (U.S. 2000)…rvailing and legitimate right of the party to determine its own membership qualifications.” Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 215-216, n. 6 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752 (1973), and Nader v. Schajfer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (Conn.), summarily aff’d, 429 U. S. 989 (1976)). The voter’s desire to [*584] participate does not become more weighty simply because the State supports it. Moreover, even if it were accurate to describe the plight of the non-party-member in a safe district as “disenfranchisement,” Pro…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence