NAOMI FOLSOM YEATS, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DRAYTON E. FOLSOM, DECEASED,
v.
MARGARET E. MOODY, ALSO KNOWN AS MARGARET E. CROWELL, ET VIR, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR
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This case involves a claim against an estate for services rendered by the plaintiff. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding sufficient evidence to support the award for the plaintiff's services, despite a statute of limitations defense.
Yes, the evidence was sufficient to support the first count of the declaration and sustain the judgment. The court found substantial evidence supported the award for services rendered.
“It is well settled that where services are rendered by one person for another which are knowingly and voluntarily accepted, without more, the law presumes that such services are given and received in the expectation of being paid for, and will imply a promise to pay what they are reasonably worth.”
This quote establishes the legal principle the court relied on to imply a promise to pay for services rendered and accepted.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff sued the estate of Drayton E. Folsom for $3,825.00, plus interest, for services rendered as a housekeeper, cook, nurse, and laundress ov…
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Defendant in error was plaintiff in the court below and sued plaintiff in error in a law action. The declaration contained two counts as follows:
“The plaintiff, Margaret E. Moody, also known as Margaret E. Crowell, joined by her husband, Thomas J. Crowell, sues the defendant, Naomi Folsom Yeats, as Administratrix of the Estate of Drayton E. Folsom, deceased, for that on the 18th day of November A. D. 1935, the defendant, Naomi Folsom Yeats, as Administratrix of the Estate of Drayton E. Folsom, deceased, was indebted to the said plaintiff for money payable by said defendant to the said plaintiff in the amount of $3,825.00, plus legal interest thereon, for work done by the said plaintiff for Drayton E. Folsom, now deceased, at his request, and in a like sum of $3825, plus legal interest for money found to be due from the said Drayton E. Folsom to the plaintiff on accounts stated between them.
“Additional Count. — Plaintiff further sues the defendant for that whereas before the 18th day of November A. D. 1935, the plaintiff, Margaret E. Moody, also known as Margaret E. Crowell, at the request of Drayton E. Folsom, now deceased, performed certain services and work for the said decedent and in consideration for such work and services the said Drayton E. Folsom, now deceased, promised the plaintiff that he would pay her upon request so much money as she has therefore reasonably deserved to receive, and plaintiff avers that she then and there reasonably deserved to have therefore the sum of $3,825.00; wherefore, the decedent then and there had notice; yet the defendant, Naomi Folsom Yeats, as Administratrix of the Estate of Drayton E. Folsom, deceased, although requested, has not paid said sum of money, nor any part thereof, and *660refused so to do to the damage of the plaintiff to the sum of $3,825.00.
“Wherefore, Plaintiff brings this suit and claims damages in the amount of $6,000.00.” - •
Bill of Particulars attached to declaration was as follows:
“Due Margaret E. Moody, also known as Margaret E. Crowell, as housekeeper, cook, nurse and laundress, for Drayton E. Folsom, now deceased:
“48 months at $75.00 a month — $3,825.00 plus legal interest thereon.”
Demurrers to both counts of the declaration were overruled and motion for better bill of particulars was denied.
Declaration was amended with leave of court by interlineation by inserting after the word “decedent” in the sixth line the following words, “as shown by the Bill of ■Particulars hereto attached,” and the Bill of Particulars was amended by interlineation by inserting the dates between which said work was done and services performed.
The defendant to both counts of the declaration pleaded:
(1) The three year statute of limitation;
(2) Payment of all of plaintiff’s claim, except the sum of Eight dollars, which sum the defendant tendered with the plea;
(3) Discharge and satisfaction of plaintiff’s claim, except the sum of eight dollars, which was tendered with the plea.
To the first count defendant pleaded: Never was indebted as alleged. To the second count defendant pleaded: (1) Never was indebted as alleged; and (2) never promised as alleged.
Issue was joined on the Pleas. Trial by jury was waived. The evidence was submitted to the court on the merits, after consideration of which judgment was entered as follows:
*661“This Cause coming on this day for trial upon stipulation of counsel waiving trial by jury, and the court-having considered the pleadings in said cause, and witnesses having been introduced by-the Plaintiff who testified in behalf of -Pláintiff, and the Defendant having testified and introduced .witnesses who testified on behalf of Defendant,- and'the court being fully advised, finds as follows: ■'
“That the Statute of Limitations has run against a portion of Plaintiff’s claim. That the Plaintiff has established her cause of action and is entitled to reasonable compensation, not barred by the Statute of Limitations, for services rendered Drayton E. Folsom, and the court 'finds the Plaintiff entitled to the sum of $2,160.00 principal’ and $194.40 interest thereon, making a total of $2,354.40.
“It is therefore, Ordered and Adjudged that the Plaintiff Margaret E. Moody, also known as Margaret E. Crowell, joined by her husband, Thomas J. Crowell, do have and recover of and from the Defendant, Naomi Folsbm Yeats, as Administratrix of the Estate of Drayton E. Folsom, deceased, the sum of $2,354.40 as damages in this cause for which let execution issue.”
The judgment of the court did not state whether the judgment was based upon one or both counts of the declaration. If the evidence sustained either count of the declaration the judgment was without error.
The plaintiff in error has attempted to state three questions for: our decision but the three questions as stated resolve themselves into one, which is, “Was the evidence sufficient to support the first count of the declaration and to sustain a judgment thereon?”
It is well settled' that where services are rendered by one person for another which are knowingly and voluntarily accepted, without more, the law presumes that such services are given and received in the expectation of being paid for, *662and will imply a promise to pay what they are reasonably worth. 28 R. C. L. 668. To like effect 71 C. J. 143. These authorities are supported by numerous decisions. See Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540; Walker v. Brown, 28 Ill. 378; Harper v. Davis, 115 Md. 349, 80 Atl. 1012; Wallace v. Schaub, 81 Md. 594, 32 Atl. 324.
It could serve no useful purpose for us to delineate the evidence pro and con. It is sufficient to say that there is substantial evidence to support the judgment and that reversible error has not been made to appear. So the judgment should be affirmed and it is so ordered.
Affirmed.
Ellis, C. J. and Terrell, J., concur.
Brown and Davis, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)…y one person for another which are knowingly and voluntarily accepted, the law presumes that such services are given and received in expectation of being paid for, and will imply a promise to pay what they are reasonably worth. Yeats v. Moody, 1937, 128 Fla. 658, 175 So. 719; 28 Fla.Jur., Restitution & Implied Contracts § 16. The liability in such cases, in the absence of any special agreement, is founded upon a presumption of law that the party benefitted undertakes to pay reasonable compensation for such…
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Swindell v. Crowson, 712 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…d under circumstances fairly raising a presumption that the parties understood and intended that compensation was to be paid. See Aldebot v. Story, 584 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). In Aldebot, the court cited the rule set forth in Yeats v. Moody, 128 Fla. 658, 661, 175 So. 719, 720 (1937), as follows: It is well settled that where services are rendered by one person for another which are knowingly and voluntarily accepted, without more, the law presumes that such services are given and received in the e…
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Hermanowski v. Naranja Lakes Condo. NO. Five, Inc., 421 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Solutec Corp. v. Young & Lawrence Associates, Inc., supra, and show that the recipient (1) acquiesced in the services, (2) was aware of an expectation of compensation, and (3) was unjustly enriched. See Yeats v. Moody, 128 Fla. 658, 175 So. 719 (1937); Coffee Pot Plaza Partnership v. Arrow Air Conditioning and Refrigeration, Inc., 412 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Nursing Care Services, Inc. v. Dobos, 380 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So.…
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