ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI
v.
MATTIS

U.S. | 1977-05-16
No. 76-1179
431 U.S. 171 Supreme Court of the United States (1977) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 52 L. Ed. 2d 219 · 97 S. Ct. 1739 · 1977 U.S. LEXIS 87 · SCDB 1976-102
Cited by 179 cases

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Holding

The Supreme Court held that the case no longer presented a live case or controversy, as there was no longer any possible basis for a damages claim or a declaratory judgment.


Facts & Procedural History

A father sued police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after his son was killed by police attempting to arrest him. The suit sought damages and a declar…

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Per_curiam
Per Curiam.

Per Curiam.

Appellee’s 18-year-old son was shot and killed by police while attempting to escape arrest. Appellee filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the police officers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He sought to recover damages, and also to obtain a declaratory judgment that the Missouri statutes authorizing the police action were unconstitutional.1 The District Court held that a defense of good faith had been established, and denied both forms of relief. No appeal was taken from the denial of damages, but appellee did seek review of the denial of declaratory relief. The Eighth Circuit held that declaratory relief was available and remanded for consideration of the merits of the constitutional issue. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F. 2d 588 (1974).

On remand, appellee filed an amended complaint, in which he made no claim for damages. The Missouri Attorney General was allowed to intervene in defense of the statutes, and the case was then submitted on stipulated facts. The District Court upheld the statutes, Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F. Supp. 643 (1975), but was reversed by a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 547 F. 2d 1007 (1976). The Attorney General brought an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2) from the holding that the state statutes were unconstitutional.

Although we are urged to consider the merits of the Court of Appeals’ holding, we are unable to do so, because this suit does not now present a live “case or controversy.” This suit was brought to determine the police officers’ liability for the death of appellee’s son. That issue has been decided, and there is no longer any possible basis for a damages claim. Nor is there any possible basis for a declaratory judgment. For a declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which “calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 242 (1937). See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941). Here, the District Court was asked to answer the hypothetical question whether the defendants would have been liable apart from their defense of good faith. No “present right” of appellee was at stake. Indeed, appellee’s primary claim of a present interest in the controversy is that he will obtain emotional satisfaction from a ruling that his son’s death was wrongful.2 Appellee’s Motion to Affirm 5-6, n. 1. Emotional involvement in a lawsuit is not enough to meet the case-or-controversy requirement; were the rule otherwise, few cases could ever become moot.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to direct the District Court to dismiss the second amended complaint.

It is so ordered.

These statutes permit police to use deadly force in apprehending a person who has committed a felony, following notice of the intent to arrest. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 559.040 and 544.190 (1969); see Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F. 2d 588, 591, and n. 4 (CA8 1974).

The second amended complaint also alleges that appellee has another son who “if ever arrested or brought under an attempt at arrest on suspicion of a felony, might flee or give the appearance of fleeing, and would therefore be in danger of being killed by these defendants or other police officers . . . .” 3 App. in Mattis v. Schnarr, No. 75-1849 (CA8), p. 5 (emphasis added). Such speculation is insufficient to establish the existence of a present, live controversy.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (46 total)

  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992)
    …rty-caused contingency, naturally enough; but they also mention the plaintiff’s failure to show that he will soon expose himself to the injury, see, e. g., Lyons, supra, at 105-106; O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 497 (1974); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173, n. 2 (1977) (per curiam). And there is certainly no reason in principle to demand evidence that third persons will take the action exposing the plaintiff to harm, while presuming that the plaintiff himself will do so. Our insistence upon…
  • City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (U.S. 1983)
    …claratory and injunctive relief and alleged past instances of police misconduct only in an attempt to establish the substantiality of the threat of future injury. There was similarly no claim for damages based on past injuries in Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171 (1977), or Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969),14 on which the Court also relies. [*124] These decisions do not support the Court’s holding today. As the Court recognized in O’Shea, standing under Art. III is established by an allegation of “‘t…
    1 / 2
  • Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1985)
    …serious bodily harm. Boston Police Department, Planning & Research Division, The Use of Deadly Force by Boston Police Personnel (1974), cited in Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F. 2d 1007, 1016, n. 19 (CA8 1976), vacated as moot sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171 (1977). Overall, only 7.5% of departmental and municipal policies explicitly permit the use of deadly force against any felon; 86.8% explicitly do not. K. Matulia, A Balance of Forces: A Report of the International Association of Chiefs of Police…
    1 / 2

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