GEORGE THOMAS BAILEY, III, APPELLANT,
v.
MABEL MOON BAILEY, APPELLEE
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In this matrimonial dispute, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a successor judge's modification of a prior decree regarding property maintenance obligations between divorced spouses. The court held that a successor judge cannot modify a predecessor judge's final orders on the same facts absent mistake or fraud, even when the successor believed the predecessor had misinterpreted an appellate mandate.
A successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse a predecessor's final orders on the same facts absent mistake or fraud. The reservation of jurisdiction in the original decree applied only to future factual situations, not to retroactive reappraisals of prior pronouncements. The successor judge's modification was therefore reversed.
“a successor judge cannot review, modify or reverse, upon the merits, on the same facts, the final orders of his predecessor, absent mistake or fraud”
Establishes the core holding prohibiting successor judges from modifying predecessor orders absent specific exceptions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced by decree in 1960. The original decree divested the husband of his interest in the marital home and awarded the wife alimony…
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The above numbered appeals have been consolidated for all appellate purposes.
In this matrimonial cause, the 1960 divorce decree between the parties was remanded by this court because the chancellor had divested the husband of his interest in the marital home and in addition had awarded the wife alimony in installment payments. Bailey v. Bailey, Fla.App., 126 So.2d 165.
Upon remand the trial court was instructed to make “such order as may appear appropriate to the chancellor to assure the upkeep of the property by the husband.”
Pursuant to the remand, the court entered a “Decree on Mandate” on June 29, 1961, wherein it ordered each party to pay one-half of the taxes and a repair bill on the property.
*532Thereafter, defendant wife moved to modify decree on the ground that the same did not comply with the opinion and mandate of this court. This motion was resisted by the plaintiff husband who contended that the decree after remand did comply with rulings of this court.
On February 28, 1963, by order, the circuit judge reaffirmed his position that the plaintiff husband should be obligated for one-half, only, of the taxes, insurance and repairs.
No appeal was taken from the said order or from the Decree on Mandate.
On hme 29, 1966 the defendant wife filed a petition for Rule to Show Cause alleging among other things a failure to make repairs to the marital home and the successor circuit judge ordered the repairs made to be borne entirely by the husband. The successor judge indicated that the prior decree (June 29, 1961) and order reaffirming same (February 28, 1963) had not correctly interpreted and carried out the mandate of this court.
We reverse. The courts of this state have repeatedly held that a successor judge cannot review, modify or reverse, upon the merits, on the same facts, the final orders of his predecessor, absent mistake or fraud. Lawyers Co-Op Pub. Co. v. Williams, 149 Fla. 390, S So.2d 871; Groover et ux. v. Walker, Fla., 88 So.2d 312; Epperson v. Epperson, Fla., 101 So.2d 367.
The reason for the rule is well stated by the Supreme Court in Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So.2d 367 at p. 369:
“As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Payne v. Superior Court for Providence County, 1951, 78 R.I. 177, 80 A.2d 159, 163, 82 A.2d 167, the rule (which it related to the law of the case) ‘is designed to promote the stability of decisions of judges of the same court and to avoid unseemly contests and differences that otherwise might arise among them to the detriment of public confidence in the judicial function.’ ”
Nor can the appellee-wife find solace in the reservation of jurisdiction contained in the Decree on Mandate. Such reservation has a well defined and accepted meaning. It applies to future factual situations, and not to retroactive reappraisals of prior pronouncements.
The question of the amount awarded for defendant-wife’s attorneys’ fee was one peculiarly within the knowledge and discretion of the judge below, and is affirmed.
The cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
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The Travelers Indem. Co. v. Walker, 401 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…action may be dismissed, specifically “without order of court” [e. s.], simply by filing a stipulation for dismissal, such as that provided by the judgment itself. Reversed.5 . But see Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla.1956); Bailey v. Bailey, 204 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). . March 17, 1980, the tenth day after recording, fell on a Monday. Thus, there was no extension under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.090(a). . In contrast, the trial court retains jurisdiction to alter interlocutory orders at any time prior to…
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Feder v. Feder, 291 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…mpany-Latin America, Fla.App. 1973, 279 So. 2d 94. Such a re-evaluation of awards made in a judgment of dissolution of marriage, after the judgment has become final, is not warranted (except for fraud or mistake). See Bailey v. Bailey, Fla.App.1967, 204 So. 2d 531; Mazzula v. Mazzula, Fla.App.1971, 256 So. 2d 62. The right of the wife to payment of the determined arrears of alimony and child support is vested. Van Loon v. Van Loon, 132 Fla. 535, 182 So. 205, 208. While it was within the discretion of the cou…
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Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956)
- Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1958)
- Lawyers Co-Operative Publ'g Co. v. Bradford G. Williams, 149 Fla. 390 (Fla. 1942)
- Bailey v. Bailey, 126 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)