ROBERT L. RUITER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Ruiter appealed the denial of his second post-conviction motion challenging the revocation of his probation and the sentence imposed thereon. The court affirmed the denial, holding that a probationer's admission of a parole violation provides sufficient basis for revocation, and that the trial court may impose any sentence it could have originally imposed upon revocation.
The court held that: (1) appointed counsel was not constitutionally required on appeal as the claim was not sufficiently complex and was manifestly without substantial merit; (2) under Florida law, a probationer's admission of a parole violation is sufficient to support revocation; and (3) the sentence imposed was legal because the trial court could impose any sentence it could have originally imposed upon revocation of probation, and the six-month to ten-year sentence was within the statutory range for robbery.
“An indigent defendant, however, is entitled to court-appointed counsel on appeal only where necessary to accomplish a fair and thorough presentation of his claims.”
Establishes the standard for when appointed counsel must be provided on appeal for indigent defendants
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRuiter was convicted of robbery and initially sentenced to six months to three years, then placed on probation for three years. He was charged with vi…
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Appellant appeals an order denying his second post-conviction motion filed pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix, to set aside the revocation of his probation and the sentence entered thereon.
Appellant was convicted of robbery and was sentenced to a prison term of six months to three years. Upon reconsideration the court below placed him on probation for a period of three years. Subsequently he was charged with violating a condition of his parole by drinking excessively. He admitted the violation at the re*557vocation hearing which followed, and the court revoked his probation and sentenced him to a prison term of six months to ten years.
Appellant then filed his first Rule 1 motion, wherein he contended that the court could not increase the sentence originally imposed. The motion was denied, and the appeal which followed was quashed by this court on the ground that the questions raised were manifestly without substantial merit. Ruiter v. State, Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 592 (mem.).
Appellant later filed his second Rule 1 motion, the denial of which led to this appeal. One of the grounds urged in support thereof, and now urged here, is the same ground which was the basis of appellant’s first motion and appeal. It has already been considered by both this court and the court below and need not be reconsidered. Fla.R.Crim.P. 1. Appellant has, however, raised three new grounds: (1) that he was unconstitutionally denied an appeal from the denial of his earlier motion; (2) that the only evidence at the revocation of probation hearing was his admission of excessive drinking and was, as such, legally insufficient to support the revocation order; and (3) that he was in effect given an unconstitutionally harsh punishment for the offense of intoxication, to wit, a seven year prison term.
Appellant’s first contention is based on this court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent him on the earlier appeal. An indigent defendant, however, is entitled to court-appointed counsel on appeal only where necessary to accomplish a fair and thorough presentation of his claims. State v. Weeks, Fla.1964, 166 So.2d 892, 897. Appellant’s aforementioned claim, that the court below illegally increased the sentence originally imposed, was not so complex that due process required this court to appoint counsel to present it on his behalf. Furthermore, Fla.Stat., Sec. 948.-06(1) (1965), F.S.A., directly contradicts the validity of such claim, rendering it, as previously held, manifestly without substantial merit. Thus, appellant was not denied his right to an appeal.
The same statute is likewise fatal to appellant’s second argument. It explicitly provides that if a probationer admits the parole violation with which he has been charged, the court may revoke his probation forthwith. Fla.Stat., Sec. 948.06(1) (1965), F.S.A.
Appellant’s final contention is also without merit. Upon revocation of his probation the court below was permitted to impose any sentence which it might originally have imposed. Fla.Stat., Sec. 948.06(1) (1965), F.S.A. The sentence of six months to ten years was imposed for the offense of robbery alone, not three years for robbery and seven years for intoxication. Since the maximum punishment for robbery is life imprisonment, Fla.Stat., Sec. 813.011 (1965), F.S.A., said sentence is legal. See Wilson v. State, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 33, 34-35; McNeely v. State, Fla.App.1966, 186 So.2d 520, 523.
In view of the foregoing, the order here appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LILES, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
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Ware v. State, 231 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)…than the original sentences. Upon denial of his petition, he has prosecuted this appeal. We find no merit in the contentions raised in the petition before the trial court. Wilson v. State, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 33; Ruiter v. State, Fla.App.1967, 205 So. 2d 556. We are concerned about what appears to be a fundamental jurisdictional problem that appears in this record, i.e., the power of the trial judge to recall the appellant before him after he had commenced the service of his sentence and after the expir…
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Jones v. State, 297 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)…s sentenced within the permissible limits allowed by law.4 Due to the nature of this appeal we are limited to a consideration and determination of the question of double jeopardy and we affirm on the authority of Ruiter v. State, Fla.App.2nd, 1967, 205 So. 2d 556. In doing so, therefore, we do not decide, nor do we need to decide, or reach, the merits of any matter, or matters, contained in the record which may be the proper subject of a subsequent motion under Rule 3.-850, CrPR, for instance, the question o…
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Anderson v. State, 287 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)…probationer guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he shall have previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation.” In Ruiter v. State, 205 So. 2d 556 (Fla.App.1967), it was held that imposition upon revocation of probation of sentence greater than that originally imposed was within the power of the trial court, where the second sentence was within statutory limitations. The Florida Supreme Court…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964)
- McNEELY v. State, 186 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Wilson v. State, 194 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- AIR Carrier Engine Serv., Inc. v. Universal Trading Corp., 188 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Peters v. Conner, 188 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)