DIANA ELLMAN RIVERS, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD ELLMAN ET UX., APPELLEES
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The appellate court affirmed an order denying a motion to set aside a sale of property, finding that the appeal from the original final decree was untimely. The court treated the appeal of the order denying the motion as an interlocutory appeal.
The appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review the final decree because the appeal was untimely. However, the court can treat the appeal of the order denying the motion as an interlocutory appeal.
“Therefore, we have no jurisdiction to review the final decree entered in the court below.”
Establishes the court's lack of jurisdiction to review the untimely appeal of the final decree.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant appealed a final decree entered on October 18, 1966, and an order denying her motion to set aside the sale of property, which was entere…
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The final decree appealed from was entered on October 18, 1966. A motion to set aside the order of sale, sale of property, and other relief was filed by appellant November 23, 1966. On February 8, 1967, an order denying appellant’s motion was entered. On February 9, 1967, the appellant filed a notice of appeal stating that she was appealing from the final decree of partition and the order denying appellant’s above-mentioned motion.
It will be observed that the appeal taken February 9, 1967, was more than sixty days from the date the final decree was entered. Therefore, we have no jurisdiction to review the final decree entered in the court below.
*457However, we do have the discretion to treat the appeal of the order denying appellant’s motion as an interlocutory appeal under Rule 4.2 of the Florida Appellate Rules, 1962 revision, 32 F.S.A. See Triax, Inc. v. City of Treasure Island, Fla.App.1967, 198 So.2d 870, and cases cited therein.
We will consider the appeal of the order denying the appellant’s motion as a perfected interlocutory appeal.
After a careful consideration of the briefs and record-on-appeal, we find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate reversible error and therefore the order appealed is affirmed.
ALLEN, Acting C. J., and PIERCE and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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DeWITT v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 268 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)…al should have been designated as an interlocutory appeal as provided by F.A.R. 4.2. However, we shall treat the appeal as an interlocutory appeal, Triax, Inc. v. City of Treasure Island, Fla.App.1967, 198 So. 2d 870; Rivers v. Ellman, Fla.App.1968, 206 So. 2d 456. Turning to the question of whether the lower Court erred in granting Seaboard’s motion for summary judgment as to punitive damages, there was no evidence that Seaboard’s negligence was of a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard…
Authorities Cited
- Triax, Inc. v. City OF Treasure Island, 198 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)