OBIDEAH FORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the appellant's allegations were either refuted by the record or insufficient as a matter of law, and thus the lower court did not err in denying the motion to vacate.
Appellant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and sentenced to fifteen years. He filed two motions to vacate the sentence, both of whi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Judgment And Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant filed this appeal from a ruling of the lower court denying his motion to vacate judgment and sentence. Appellant files this appeal under Rule 1.850 (formerly Rule No. 1) of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A.
Appellant was arrested without a warrant on May 8, 1965. On June 21, 1965, appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury and charged with rape. On September 13, 1965, appellant was arraigned with counsel present and pleaded not guilty. On October 18, 1965, appellant was tried and found guilty of assault with intent to commit rape and was sentenced to a term of fifteen years in the State Prison. On August 22, 1966, appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Sentence under Rule No. 1 of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was denied by the lower court. On June 23, 1967, appellant filed a second motion to vacate, which was denied by the lower court. This appeal is from the denial of appellant’s second motion to vacate.
The appellant has asked us to consider all of the allegations as a whole to determine if the record indicates that he was denied a fair trial.
In the case of Reddick v. State, Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 340, 350, it is stated:
“ * * * the true criterion of whether collateral attack is permissible is not, as a general rule, whether a specific constitutional guaranty was violated, but whether the defendant, on the whole record, was denied a fair trial.”
After a very careful review of the record we can find nothing to show that the appellant was prejudiced in any way which could determine that he was not given a fair trial. The allegations contained in appellant’s motion are either refuted by the record, or are insufficient as a matter of law. We must and do affirm the action of the lower court in denying appellant’s motion to vacate as brought under Rule 1.850 (formerly Rule No. 1) of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Affirmed.
LILES, C. J., and ALLEN and PIERCE, JJ., concur.