CROWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE OF TENNESSEE, ET AL.
v.
MADER ET AL.
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The Court vacated its prior order dismissing the entire action as moot, directing instead that the District Court's judgment be vacated without prejudice to further proceedings.
The District Court invalidated a 1973 legislative redistricting plan and retained jurisdiction. The State appealed, and the appellees argued the case …
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Per Curiam.
The petition for rehearing is granted.
In Kopald v. Carr, 343 F. Supp. 51 (MD Tenn. 1972), the District Court applied this Court’s earlier holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), to invalidate two senatorial dis-tricting plans. That decision resulted in the formulation of a so-called court ordered “Kopald Plan.” That plan was superseded by a 1973 legislative plan.
In this litigation the District Court invalidated the 1973 legislative plan. It enjoined the defendants from conducting any elections pursuant to that plan and retained jurisdiction to review whatever substitute the Tennessee General Assembly might enact prior to June 1, 1979, or, if necessary, to reinstate the 1972 “Kopald Plan.” The court further ordered a hearing to award fees to plaintiffs’ counsel.
In response to the State’s appeal to this Court, appellees pointed out that the legislature had enacted a new plan effective on June 6, 1979, argued that the controversy over the validity of the 1973 legislative plan had therefore become moot; and requested that the appeal therefore be dismissed. This Court, following a practice that is appropriate when an entire case has become moot but which is inappropriate when only the issues raised on appeal have been resolved, entered an order directing that the judgment of the District Court be vacated and that the entire action be dismissed as moot. Post, p. 806.
The recent legislation did not moot the entire case, but only the issues raised on appeal. Appellees may still wish to attack the newly enacted legislation or apply for attorney’s fees. We therefore vacate our prior order. In lieu thereof, we direct that the judgment of the District Court be vacated without prejudice to such further proceedings in the District Court as may be appropriate. See Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U. S. 412 (1972).
It is so ordered.
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Kinsler v. Rohm Tool Corp., 386 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…y, amenable to personal service and financially responsible.3 All the cases4 relied upon by the plaintiff recognize this salient distinction except that of Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 75 Ill. 393, 389 N.E. 2d 155 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060, 100 S.Ct. 992, 62 L.Ed.2d 738 (1980). However, Connelly v. Uniroyal is readily distinguishable from the present case because there Uniroyal participated in the domestic chain of distribution of tires manufactured in Belgium and, in effect, held itself out as the…
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Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980)…n v. Watkins, 616 F. 2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980). We dismissed only the appeal as moot in our prior decision, not the entire action. Appellees were therefore free to apply for attorneys’ fees in the district court. See Crowell v. Mader, - U.S. -, -, 100 S.Ct. 992, 992, 62 L.Ed.2d 701, 703 (1980). The district court awarded the fees in the present case as part of its original order, with the amount to be set later. Claims for attorneys’ fees ancillary to the case survive independently under the court’s equit…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (U.S. 1962)
- Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, 404 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1972)